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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
Introduction
In approaching a scientific theory from an experi­
mental point of view, the experimenter may concern himself 
with two major kinds of problems. On the one hand, he may 
direct his research efforts to the development of experi­
mental tests of the relationships hypothesized to exist 
among the explanatory constructs of the theory. The aim in 
this approach is to provide tests of the validity of the 
hypothesized relationships, thus throwing some light on the 
level of confidence with which the theory as a construction 
of events is to be accepted. If the results of the experi­
ments are largely positive, confidence will be increased in 
relation to both the particular constructs which the theory 
utilizes in abstracting events and the nature of the rela­
tions hypothesized to exist among these constructs. If the 
results of the experiments are largely negative, doubt is 
thrown on either the adequaoy of the constructs, the rela­
tions hypothesized to exist among them, or both.
The experimenter may, however, direot his attention to 
determining the extensiveness of the theory; the range of 
events which can be construed by the theory in such a way
1
that they can be predicted. In this type of research the 
experimenter applies the constructs of the theory to an 
increasingly wider range of events, determining with each 
step the validity with which the events are predioted. The 
major purpose here is to determine the confidence levels 
which can be placed on predictions of events made on the 
basis of the theory and the range of events to which the 
theory can be usefully applied.
For the sake of convenience we can label the first 
approaoh as "definition” of the theory inasmuch as the pur­
pose is to clarify already hypothesized relationships. The 
seoond approach could be labeled as "elaboration” of the 
theory since the major concern is the extension of the 
application of the theory to an ever-increasing range of 
events.
This study is primarily an example of the "definitive” 
approaoh to a particular psychological theory. Its major 
purpose is to develop experimental tests of the relation­
ships hypothesized to exist among several of the theory’s 
major constructs. The particular theory has been developed 
and described by Kelly (29), and has been generally 
referred to as the psychology of personal constructs or per­
sonal construct theory.
Our primary purpose in the present paper, then, shall 
be to develop experimental tests based on the relationships 
hypothesized to exist among several of the major constructs
3of Kelly’s personal construct theory. It is the writer’s 
belief that should the results prove largely positive, more 
confidence oan be placed upon both the particular con­
structs the theory utilizes and the relations said to exist 
among those constructs.
The Psychology of Personal Constructs: The Relation
Between Anticipation and Constructs
In discussing personal constructs theory our approaoh 
shall be constricted rather than comprehensive. To attempt 
to give a comprehensive summary of the theory would lead us 
far beyond the scope of the present study. Rather, we 
shall limit our discussion of the theory to certain con­
structs and relationships which we feel need further "def­
inition" as we hav6 used the term.
Basically, the postulate and first corollary of 
Kelly’s approach can be viewed as an expression of the re­
lationship between the familiar constructs of anticipation 
and conceptualization. The postulate reads: "A person’s
processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in 
which he anticipates events." (29, p. 46). The first 
corollary to the postulate states: "A person anticipates
events by construing their replications." (29, p. 50).
Here we can see that although the theory utilizes the 
familiar constructs of anticipation and oonoeptualization, 
those constructs occupy a basic position' in the theory 
rather than the ancillary position they have oocupled in
4most traditional approaches. It is suggested that if we 
wish to predict the direotion of an individual's processes, 
when looked on from a psychological point of view, we might 
usefully construe them as the result of the ways in which 
his constructs determine the kinds of predictions he will 
make about the events which make up his environment.
Let us take a closer look, then, at what is meant by a 
construct and the process of construing. Philosophically, 
Kelly maintains that the world exists as an organized pro­
cess and can be ordered on a time line in terms of ante­
cedent and consequent events. Although the same event may 
never occur twice, certain events may be considered as 
replications of earlier events in that they-bear certain 
similarities. The individual, in his attempt to anticipate 
his world, forms abstractions based on his perception of 
similarities between two or more events and the simultane­
ous differentiation of these events from others. The 
resulting abstraction of suoh a simultaneous similarity- 
different iation is called a construct and the process of 
abstracting is oalled construing. While a oonstruot is 
usually based on an abstraction from many events, in its 
simplest form it is the way in which two events are seen as 
similar while, at the same time, being seen as different 
from a third event. It is thus possible for a oonstruot to 
be formed on the basis of just three perceived events.
5An interesting point is the fact that a construct, 
once formed, itself becomes an event in the individuals 
experience. It, too, can then be construed along with 
other construot-events. Thus we might consider an indi­
vidual in the construer’s experience as a oonstruot in the 
sense that certain events are seen as similar (as being 
associated with the individual) and at the same time dif­
ferent from other events (in being associated with other 
individuals). We customarily label such constructs as 
these by the use of proper names. These constructs may 
then become the elements of further construing, in this 
case the construer perceiving certain individuals as being 
alike and at the same time ^ different from other individ­
uals. In this way, each individual may form a system of 
constructs with certain relations holding among the con­
structs within the system.
Once formed, a construct acts as a dimension in regard 
to which events may be ordered and as the basis upon which 
the relations among events may be predioted. Once a cer­
tain construction has been placed upon a given set of 
events, it can be predicted that other events which can be 
construed in a certain way will follow in time. For 
example, once an event has been construed by an individual 
as a "light” event it may be predicted by the individual 
that other events which oan be construed as "heat” events
6will follow. This is, of course, contingent upon the 
individual*s already having formed the oonstruot of heat.
It would be impossible for him to predict the ooourrenoe of
an event or events which could be construed in a certain
way if he had not already formed the construct. Nor could 
he have made the prediction had he not already developed a 
way of construing the antecedent event. In this manner we 
can see that the predictions an individual makes are com­
pletely dependent upon the constructs with which he is able
to organize his world. He is able to relate events only in
terms of the ways in which he is able to construe those 
events.
Validation and Invalidation of Predictions
A question must arise, though, as to why the individ­
ual, perceiving the occurrence of an event which he con­
strues in a certain way, will predict the subsequent 
occurrence of certain events and not others. In other 
words, having onoe construed an event as a "light" event, 
why should the individual predict that events which can be 
construed as "heat" events will follow rather than events 
which can be construed as "strong" events. Conceivably, it 
would be possible for the individual to prediot the occur­
rence of any construed event to follow the occurrence of 
any other construed event. It is at this point that the 
notion of validation or invalidation of a prediction must 
be considered. Having onoe made a prediction of the
7occurrence of an event whioh can be construed in a oertain 
way, the individual is usually able to determine whether or 
not the predicted event ooours. If it is perceived as 
occurring, the prediction is invalidated or at least doubt 
is cast upon its validity* Something further happens, 
however. One might have plaoed some other construction on 
the antecedent or consequent events. These events might be 
construed in various ways. For example, an individual 
might observe one person strike another noisily on the 
back. He might construe this as a "hostile" event and pre­
dict the subsequent occurrence of events which could be 
construed as "fighting." However he observes only laugh­
ter, smiles, and handshakes, events which he construes as 
"friendly." Several possibilities are open to him: His
prediction that "fighting" follows "hostile" events may be 
wrong; his construction of handshakes, laughter, and smiles 
as "friendly" may be inadequate; his construction of back 
slapping events as "hostile" may be inadequate. Assuming 
that he wishes to be able to predict suoh event-series in 
the future, he must either reconstrue the antecedent or 
consequent events, or both, or change his prediction of 
what occurs following the perception of "hostile" events.
In the course of experience with similarly construed events 
he may try all three. Presumably, the individual will vary 
his constructions and his predictions until he is able to 
make predictions which he can oonstrue as valid.
8The changes which occur in the individual’s construct 
system and in his behavior as a result of invalidation of 
his anticipations have been, of course, a matter of concern 
in Kelly’s approach. Such concepts as threat, fear, and 
anxiety are built upon a discussion of such changes. To be 
sure, Kelly’s definitions of these constructs involve more 
than a simple change in the oonstruot system, but all of 
them involve this factor. Although it would be impossible 
in this presentation to give a complete description of the 
effects of invalidation in Kellyrs system (see 29, Chap. 10 
for a further disoussion) the following may be said: The
individual is striving for optimal anticipation of events. 
Difficulties in construing events lead to invalid predic­
tions and consequently to the necessity of changing the 
construct system. Kelly maintains that if the necessitated 
reconstruction involves certain important constructs in 
terms of which the self is ordered the individual is 
"threatened.” If the individual feels himself unable to 
construe or reconstrue the events adequately, ’♦anxiety” 
results. Although Kelly prefers not to deal with emotions 
in the usual sense, the writer would maintain that percep­
tion of invalidating evidence leading to such processes 
would be described by the individual as ’distressing,” 
’’fearful,” or at least ’’discomforting.” He would, there­
fore, reason that individuals will generally report 
experiencing such feelings in regard to events about which
9they make a series of invalid predictions. This is, of 
oourse, dependent upon the proposition that they construe 
their predictions as being invalidated. They will not 
always do so, and in such oases we would not expect them to 
report such feelings. However, if an individual is forced 
to make a large number of predictions on the basis of his 
construction of certain events, he is sooner or later 
likely to become aware of the fact if he is making invalid 
predictions. It is at this point that we would expect him 
to become apprehensive in regard to the events.
Let us apply this reasoning to other individuals, as 
construct-events, within the construer’s experience. Let 
us suppose that he has made certain predictions about these 
individuals. Something goes wrong. His predictions are 
invalidated. He is then forced to re-examine his construc­
tions of these individuals. Here is a series of events 
which he is having difficulty anticipating. We would 
hypothesize that those events (including individuals) which 
the oonstruer finds difficult to predict, will be encoun­
tered with a certain amount of apprehension, and that the 
oonstruer will report feelings of discomfort or distress in 
regard to them.
Measurement of Personal Constructs
So far we have had quite a bit to say about the 
process of construing and about constructs themselves.
What has been said would certainly imply that if we are to
10
deal with an individual we should have some methods of 
learning how he organizes his world; the constructions 
which he places upon events. Within the framework of the 
psychology of personal constructs such a method has been 
devised. It is called The Role Construct Repertory Test. 
or as it is more customarily'referred to, the RCRT (see 
appendix B for an example of a test devised on the princi­
ple of the RCRT for use in the present study). Kelly has 
described this method thoroughly (29, chap. 5), so only a 
brief description will be given here.
Stated simply, the RCRT is a test developed for the 
purpose of eliciting some of the important constructs the 
individual uses in dealing with his world. In the form 
most commonly used, the individual’s constructs concerning 
other persons have been the ones to which the test is 
directed. Within Kelly’s approach these have been called 
’role” constructs inasmuch as they are viewed as determin­
ing the role which the individual will play with other per­
sons. In its method the test is similar to the more 
familiar object sorting test such as the Vigotsky blocks or 
the BRL objects. However, instead of sorting objects the 
individual is asked to sort people. In this procedure it 
is similar to the sorting employed in the Horowitz Races 
Test (26) and to Hartley’s (22) use of pictures in a sort­
ing test. Rotter and lessor have also reported a similar 
approaoh in having subjects sort MAPS test figures in a
11
study dealing with "social constructs."
In taking the RCRT the individual is first asked to 
designate certain persons from his past and present 
environment who best exemplify certain role titles. In a 
sociological approach the role titles might be desoribed as 
"positions" in the sense that Newcomb uses the term. The 
role titles have been chosen so as to represent rather 
important personal interaction figures in the individuals 
life. In its present form the RCRT utilizes twenty-two 
suoh figures. The titles include such figures as the 
individual’s parents, present and past friends of both 
sexes, persons in both his present and past life with whom 
he is likely to have interacted in terms of an authority 
relationship (teaohers, employers), persons toward whom he 
has reacted positively and negatively, persons whom he 
feels have liked and disliked him, and persons with whom he 
is likely to associate certain personal values such as 
intelligence and success. After the individual has named 
the persons in his experience who best exemplify the role 
titles he is asked to consider certain triads made up of 
various combinations of the persons whom he has named. He 
is asked to think about the three persons in each triad and 
then to write the word or phrase which best describes the 
most important way in which two of them are alike and at 
the same time different from the third. He is then asked 
to state the opposite of this characteristic. If the
12
reader will remember our discussion of constructs in which 
it was stated that a oonstruot is the way in which certain 
events are seen as being similar and at the same time seen 
as being different from other events, he will observe that 
in the RCRT we are asking the individual to state the ways 
in which he construes certain important individuals in his 
life. He is then asked to complete the same process with 
further figure-triads (twenty-two in all), each time 
stating the important way in which two of the figures are 
similar and then stating the opposite of this character­
istic .
The format of the RCRT which is at present most 
oommonly used is that of a grid with the role titles or 
personal figures listed on one axis and the construct 
dimensions on the other. The intersection of each row and 
oolumn forms a cell (an example of such a grid can be seen 
in appendix B). After the individual has formed his con­
struct dimension on three of the twenty-two figures 
(designated by ciroled cells in the first row of the grid) 
he is asked to consider the other nineteen figures in terms 
of this construct dimension. He is instructed to place a 
checkmark in the cell of each of the figures that might 
also be described as having the characteristic by which two 
of the figures in the triad were seen as similar and to 
leave blank the cell of any individual who could be
described as having the characteristic whioh is the oppo­
site of the way in which the two were seen as similar. For 
example, if the figures are placed along the columns of the 
grid and the construct dimensions make up the rows, each 
row will yield a construct dimension which has been formed 
on a different figure-triad. Let us suppose that in deal­
ing with the first triad of figures, a testee states that 
two of them are alike and at the same time different from 
the third person in that they are "friendly" and that the 
opposite of this characteristic is "unfriendly.” He then 
proceeds to consider the nineteen other persons represented 
by cells in that construct row (three have already been 
used in developing the construct) and to place a checkmark 
in the oell corresponding to each person whom he oonsiders 
to be a "friendly" person, leaving blank each cell repre­
senting a person whom he oonsiders to be "unfriendly." The 
process is then repeated for the remaining twenty-one rows. 
In this way each role-figure is described (by either a 
check or a void) in terms of each oonstruot.
Within the psychology of personal constructs various 
analyses of RCRT protocols have been made in terms of the 
distribution of checks and voids within an individuals 
grid. We can see that by having both figures and con­
structs represented on the grid, various analyses oan be 
made of the interaction of these two variables. However,
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certain theoretical problems have been raised in regard to 
the procedure by some of Kelly*s students and by Kelly him­
self. These problems arise out of the possible interpreta­
tions of the comparative meaning of cheoks and voids.
The reader will remember that in discussing constructs 
we emphasized both the aspeots of perceived similarity 
among certain events and the simultaneous differentiation 
of these events from other events. Kelly has maintained 
that it is impossible to designate certain events as being 
similar without at the same time pointing out that these 
events are different, in respect to this oharaoteristic. 
from other events. He has also maintained that the way in 
which the events are set off from others is as meaningful 
as the way in which they are seen as similar. A oonstruot 
is seen by Kelly as being a dichotomous abstraction in 
which both the similarity and differentiation poles are 
equally pertinent. Thus it is assumed that when an indi­
vidual construes certain events as "Blaok" he is also 
differentiating these events, not simply from non-blaok 
events as traditional logic would imply, but from events 
which are seen as "white." When the individual uses con­
structs he uses them dichotomously, and if we wish to 
understand his processes we must utilize the differentia­
tions he draws as well as the similarities.
This approaoh, of course, raises many questions such
as the apparent finer differentiations which can be 
observed in persons1 thinking than a dichotomous approaoh 
would seem to allow. Kelly has dealt with many of these 
questions (see Chap, 3), and to deal with all of them here 
would be irrelevant in terms of the present study. How­
ever, as the reader can see from our discussion of the 
RCRT, this interpretation of the construing process is 
reflected in the test in that those cells which are left 
blank by the subjeot are used in exactly the same way and 
are thought to be as meaningful in terms of plotting the 
individual’s use of his constructs as are those cells which 
are checked. For example, when an individual forms a con­
struct dimension such as "friendly-unfriendly” on a triad 
of figures and oonsiders the other figures in terms of 
this dimension, it is assumed that when he checks a cell it 
means that he is describing the individual corresponding to 
this cell as friendly and when he leaves a cell blank he is 
describing that individual as unfriendly. Some would argue 
that a cell left blank might simply indicate that the 
testee felt this person was less friendly than the others, 
or that the testee could not decide whether or not he 
would describe this person as friendly or unfriendly. In 
other words the friendly-unfriendly dimension might not 
apply to this individual. These persons would argue that a 
cell left blank (we shall refer to this as a void) does not
16
impart as much information and is thus not of equal meaning 
to a cell which has been oheoked.
This is, of oourse, in its simpler terms a- method­
ological problem in the construction and interpretation of 
the RCRT. Much dependence, however, is placed on this 
interpretation of the relative meaning of checks and voids 
in analyzing RORT protocols, so we feel it is a question 
worth considering in an experimental approach.
Summary
We did not set out with the purpose, in this presen­
tation, of giving a complete description of the psychology 
of personal constructs. To obtain this, one would do 
better to read Kelly^ book. We did, however, wish to dis­
cuss oertain constructs and relationships within the theory 
with the view of approaching them in an experimental man­
ner. Let us, then, summarize what we have said in relation 
to these constructs and relationships. We shall then see 
if we can develop some hypotheses whioh will help us evalu­
ate their usefulness.
First, let us recall Kellyrs statement of the basic 
postulate and the first corollary whioh read, respectively, 
"A person*s processes are psychologically channelized by 
the ways in which he anticipates events." and "A person 
anticipates events by construing their replications." In 
considering these, along with a further disoussion of
17
constructs, we noted that Kelly is asking us to assume that 
the individual's anticipations of events depend upon the 
constructions which he places on his world of experience.
In other words, the predictions which an individual makes 
about events depend upon the ways in which he construes 
those events. Of course, all theories involve assumptions 
of this type in their structure. We are either willing or 
not willing to accept them. However, our acceptance or 
non-acceptance of them will depend upon several factors.
One of the major questions we might ask ourselves is, "Are 
hypotheses developed as a result of accepting this assump­
tion largely validated or invalidated?" If most of the 
hypotheses are validated, we will tend to accept it as an 
at least temporarily useful way of looking at things; if 
not, we will tend to reject it as useful for our purposes. 
In approaching personal construct theory, we can thus 
justifiably ask ourselves, "Is the assumption that people 
use constructs as a basis for predicting events one which 
can be maintained in the light of experimental evidence?"
The second area of interest we touched upon was the 
relationship between the individual's ability to make valid 
predictions about an event or events and his reactions to 
that event. More specifically, we concerned ourself with 
the notion that the perception that oneTs predictions con­
cerning an event were invalid might lead the predictor to
18
feel apprehensive or uncomfortable in regard to the event. 
We further reasoned that if the individual construed his 
predictions concerning another person as being invalidated, 
he might become apprehensive in regard to that individual. 
In approaching this question experimentally we might ask 
ourselves, "Are an individual’s stated feelings of comfort 
or discomfort in regard to other persons related to whether 
his predictions about them are valid or invalid?”
Our third area of interest was the measurement of the 
person’s construct system through the use of the RCRT.
Here, we were particularly interested in a methodological 
problem; the interpretations which are placed upon the com­
parative meaning of checks and voids when the grid form of 
the test is used. We pointed out that questions might be 
raised as to whether or not one could interpret voids on 
the RCRT as indicating that the testee would describe the 
individual as having the characteristic which he saw as the 
opposite of the similarity pole of a dichotomous oonstruot. 
We might then ask ourselves in regard to this matter, "Can 
voids on the grid form of the RCRT be interpreted in the 
same way that checks can be interpreted?”
As we have stated them, these questions are quite 
"loose” in form and thus not directly amenable to strict 
experimental treatment. We have thus far considered them 
only as questions which might lead us to the development of 
more "brittle” hypotheses which, in turn, may help us
19
evaluate the tenability of personal construct theory as an 
approach to human personality. In the next chapter we 
shall, therefore, attempt to "tighten” our thinking about 
these questions and formulate hypotheses about them which 
will lend themselves to a more rigorous approach. Should 
the hypotheses be validated or invalidated we do not feel 
it will "make or break" the psychology of personal con­
structs. However, the interpretation we place upon our 
final results, when combined with the results of other
4
studies, will help us establish limits of confidence whioh 
we feel we can place on the theory as a useful approach to 
understanding and predicting human behavior.
CHAPTER II
STATEMENT OE HYPOTHESES
In the first chapter we disoussed three major areas 
of the psychology of personal constructs and raised a 
loosely formulated question about each area. We believe 
that the answers we are able to develop in regard to our 
questions will throw some light on the degree of confidence 
which we can place on the theory as an approach to person­
ality. In their loosely stated form, however, the ques­
tions are not directly amenable to experimental treatment. 
We shall now restate the questions in hypothetical form so 
that we may treat them experimentally.
The First Hypothesis
The reader will remember that our first question dealt 
with the tenability of the assumption that an individual's 
predictions are based upon his personal constructs. We 
realized that we could not directly test an assumption, but 
we also realized that our willingness to accept or not 
accept it would depend upon the degree to which hypotheses 
developed on the basis of the assumption were validated in
experimental studies. Let us see, then, if we can develop
an hypothesis on the basis of this assumption which most of
our readers will agree throws some light on the assumption.
20
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We start, therefore, with the assumption that a per­
sons predictions about events depend upon his constructs. 
We have already disoussed how other persons can be con­
strued in terms of peroelved similarities and differences. 
What should happen, according to the assumption we have 
just made, if two or more persons are construed as being 
alike? If an individual’s predictions depend upon his con­
structs, and if the individual construes two or more people 
as being alike, would we not expeot that if we ask the 
oonstruer to make a number of predictions about the behav­
ior of these same people he will prediot them to behave 
alike? In other words, if interpersonal predictions depend 
upon the ways in which the individual construes other 
persons, we would expect him to predict those persons he 
construes as similar to behave similarly when faced with 
the same situations. Our first hypothesis thus states:
When persons are construed by an individual as 
being similar they will be predicted as beEaving 
similarly in given choice situations.
The Second Hypothesis
The second point in our discussion of personal con­
struct theory dealt with the relation between the individ­
ual’s feelings of "comfort’’ in relation to another person 
and the degree to whioh he can validly prediot the behavior 
of that person. We raised the question as to whether or 
not experiencing feelings whioh oould be described as
oomfortable or uncomfortable in regard to other persons is 
related to the validity with whioh an individual is able to 
predict the behavior of those persons. Our seoond hypo­
thesis can thus be stated:
The behavior in certain choice situations of those 
persons with whom an individual feels "oomfortable" 
will be predicted more validly than the behavior 
of those with whom he feels "unoomfortable."
The Third Hypothesis
The third point in our disoussion dealt with the com­
parative meaning of oheoks and voids when the grid form of 
the RCRT is used. We were concerned with whether or not 
voids could be interpreted and utilized in exaotly the same 
way as checks.
The reader will remember that in our discussion of the 
RORT we stated that each role figure was described, either 
by a oheok or a void, in relation to eaoh construct. Thus 
in an RCRT protocol whioh oonsists of 22 triad-sorts, eaoh 
figure will be desoribed in relation to eaoh of 22 con­
struct dimensions by a oheok or a void. By determining 
whether any two individuals both have oheoks or both have 
voids when described by the same oonstruot we oan, there­
fore, determine whether they are seen as similar or differ­
ent in terms of that oonstruct. For example, if the first 
construct dimension is "happy— sad," and if the testee 
places checkmarks in the cells corresponding to persons A 
and B, he is describing both of these persons as "happy"
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and we can say that they are seen as similar in terms of 
this construct. Likewise, if the testee leaves both cells 
blank, we can say that they are both described as "sad” and 
are again seen as similar in terms of this oonstruot. If 
he plaoes a check in the cell corresponding to one and a 
void in the cell corresponding to the other, we can say 
that they are seen as different in terms of this construct. 
This same type of analysis can then be made for all 
twenty-two construct sorts.
The RCRT, therefore, provides us with three possible 
measures of the similarity with which the role figures are 
construed: (1) Similarity as measured by correspondence of
oheoks, (2) similarity as measured by correspondence of 
voids, and (3) similarity as measured by oheoks and voids 
taken together. Next, let us suppose that we correlate the 
similarity with whioh an individual construes certain of 
the role figures with some other measure of similarity of 
these same persons; how similarly he predicts they will 
behave in a number of situations, for example. It will 
then be possible to obtain three measures of the correla­
tion between similarity of construction and similarity of 
prediction, depending upon whether we measure similarity of 
construction by correspondence of checks alone, voids 
alone, or checks and voids together.
But Kelly's approach to the interpretation of the RCRT 
has assumed that oheoks and voids are equally meaningful
and can be interpreted in the same way. On the basis of 
this assumption we would expeot that these two measures of 
similarity of construction would correlate equally with the 
single variable of similarity of prediction.1 In other
■*"We are assuming that such factors as the variance of 
the two measures of similarity of construction will not 
differ significantly.
words, if oheoks and voids are equally meaningful and can
be interpreted in the same way, and we correlate similarity
of construction as measured by oheoks alone and as measured
by voids alone with the single variable of similarity of
prediction, we should expeot the two correlations to be
equal. Our third hypothesis is thus:
There will be no difference between the correlation 
of similarity of construction and similarity of 
prediction when similarity of oonstruotion is meas­
ured by oorrespondenoe of RCRT grid checks and 
when similarity of construction is measured by 
oorrespondenoe of RCRT arid voids.
The fourth Hypothesis
The fourth hypothesis is not one derived directly from
the psychology of personal constructs although it is in no
way contradictory to what would be predicted by the theory.
Nor is it a "new" hypothesis in the sense that it has never
been dealt with before in other contexts. However, we felt
that it was of enough interest and possible value to
include within the formal statement of the hypotheses with
which this study is conoerned.
In our discussion of personal construct theory we have 
pointed out the important position which the concept of 
validity of personal predictions holds in the theory. 
Changes in the struoture of the personal oonstruot system 
are viewed in terms of the individual’s construction of his 
predictions as being invalid. Many of the basic oonoepts 
of the psychological point of view such as anxiety, threat, 
and fear are seen as related to the making of invalid pre­
dictions, and in a sense, even the oonoepts of adjustment 
and maladjustment can be viewed, within the theory, as 
related to the validity of one’s predictions about his 
environment, Questions must arise, then, as to what are 
the factors entering into the making of valid and invalid 
predictions.
Nor has the importance of this question been limited 
to personal construct theory. In a recent review of 
studies involving "judgments” of various behaviors of other 
persons, Taft (41) reports studies dealing with the rela­
tion between validity of judgments and suoh aspects of the 
prediotor as personality traits, age, sex, family back­
ground, intelligence, training, etc. Since in the present 
study we have obtained a measure of the validity of predic­
tions of judgments, had it been our purpose, we might have 
studied any or all of these relationships. Our reasons for 
not doing so are obvious. Our principal interest lies in
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personal construct theory. However, one aspect whioh we 
would hypothesize to he important in determining the 
validity of predictions whioh one individual makes about 
the behavior of another has been either overlooked or 
treated as "error" in most of the studies dealing with this 
problem. This is the actual behavioral similarity between 
the prediotor and the predicted person.
We would argue that as the individual observes the 
behavior of another person he builds up a subjective 
estimate as to whether this other person is similar or dis­
similar to himself (this might be viewed theoretically as 
another construct within the individual's construct sys­
tem). We would also argue that when forced to prediot the 
behavior of this person in a given situation, this estimate 
of similarity is utilized in making the prediction. Then, 
assuming that the individual is generally the best pre­
diotor of his own behavior in a large number of situations 
and that his estimates of similarity and dissimilarity 
between himself and others are not completely unreal!stio,2
2Such studies as that of Soodel and Mussen (30) would 
suggest that the validity of suoh estimates do vary to some 
degree in relation to oertain personality oharaoteristios.
we would reason that when two persons are actually similar 
there is a greater likelihood of their predictions about 
one another being valid than when they are dissimilar. In 
other words, since an Individual is likely to be the best
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prediotor of his own behavior in a number of specific situ­
ations, he is also likely to be able to prediot most 
validly the behavior of persons whom he correctly judges as 
similar to himself* Even though he correotlv judges a per­
son to be dissimilar to himself, he is less likely to be 
able to prediot that person's behavior validly since on 
this basis alone all he can predict is that the person will 
behave differently than he will.
Certainly, we would not expect any measurement of the 
relationship between actual similarity and validity of pre­
dictions to show a high correlation. Suoh factors as the 
bases on which the estimate of similarity is made (although 
two persons may be similar in regard to certain character­
istics, they will undoubtedly be different in regard to 
others) and the tendenoy of some persons to see more simi­
larity between themselves and others (of, Seodel and Mussen 
study) them actually exists would operate to lower the 
relationship. However, when a relatively large number of 
predictions are made by a group we would expeot to find a 
low but positive relationship between these two variables. 
Our fourth hypothesis thus reads:
When persons are asked to predict the behavior of 
others they will predict most validly those individ­
uals whom they most resemble in their behavioral 
choices.
CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Introduction
We introduced our problem by stating tbat we would 
attempt to define further the relationship existing among 
certain of the constructs in Kelly*s personal oonstruot 
theory* In considering the basic postulate and first 
corollary we saw that man’s processes are viewed by Kelly 
as being channelized by the ways in which he anticipates 
events, and that his anticipations can be seen as being 
structured in terms of the ways in whioh he oonstrues 
events* We also considered some of the effects of valida­
tion and invalidation of man's personal predictions. In 
this chapter we shall review the psychological literature 
to see how others have dealt with the same or similar 
constructions of man.
Man as an Anticipator
The concept that man's behavior can be predicted and 
understood only if we take into account the hypotheses or 
expectancies which he develops in regard to his environment 
is to be found in many approaches to psychological prob­
lems. In dealing with suoh problems as learning, percep­
tion, and in a few oases the total personality,
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psychologists have at one time or another utilized such a 
construct. Basically, however, a line can be drawn in 
terms of whether or not the psychologist's approach to be­
havior has been developed along the traditional path of a 
cognitive theory or an assooiationistic theory. Those 
dealing with behavior in terms of some variant of the 
establishment of stimulus-response bonds have tended, on 
the whole, to reject all phenomena whioh they oonsider 
tttingedn with mentalism, and have thus rejected expectancy 
or anticipation as an adequate explanatory oonstruot. Many 
of those who have felt the neoessity of developing some 
method of dealing with the individual's cognitive processes 
have utilized the construct in some form. In dealing with 
the construct of anticipation we will therefore find our­
selves dealing with some of the issues involved in the cog­
nitive vs. assooiationistic controversy.
Since the use of the construct of anticipation is so 
varied and widespread, a thorough coverage of the litera­
ture oould probably be eonsidered a major work in itself. 
Our approaoh shall therefore be summary and illustrative 
rather than exhaustive. We shall attempt to show only that 
it has been used by psychologists in dealing with various 
problems rather than attempting to outline all of the 
particular ways in whioh it has been employed. Also, in 
order to avoid duplication we shall refer quite freely to 
previous, more exhaustive summaries of speoific issues.
Perhaps one of the earliest uses of the oonstruot of 
anticipation is to he found in some of John Dewey’s work*
As early as 1910 (14), in describing various types of 
thought, Dewey argued that man is stirred to reflective 
thought only through the neoessity of making predictions 
about an environment whose relationships and behavior are 
originally unknown to him. In the interaction of man and 
his environment, "perplexities* and "confusions" arise. In 
response to these man must develop theories whioh guide his 
predictions. The hypotheses and, consequently, the theo­
ries are checked by the degree of prediction to whioh they 
lead. In this way man’s thinking and, in turn, his behav­
ior are seen as structured by his anticipations.
It is in the traditional area of learning theory, 
however, that the issues have been most clearly drawn. In 
thi3 field the studies arising out of the differences in 
interpretation between the assooiationistic and cognitive 
approaches have literally filled psychological journals. 
Since, of course, the anticipatory construct has tradi­
tionally been utilized in relation to the cognitive 
approaches, these shall form the center of our interests.
The work of the Gestalt psychologists Kohler and 
Koffka, with their emphasis on the active part whioh man’s 
processes played in his perceptions of his environment, had 
the effect of once again opening up the cognitive areas as 
a "legitimate" issue after its "suppression" by the work of
the early "behavior!ats. Their work may thus be seen as 
having a catalytic effect upon the whole cognitive 
approach. More specifically, however, the work of Tolman 
(43) may be viewed as the "central area" of the oonflict, 
Tolman, working within the framework of learning objected 
to the implication in contemporary S-R theory that the 
organism is driven along a specific route by internal and 
external stimuli, learning the correct movement sequences 
so that they can be duplicated upon the reestablishment of 
the same stimulus and drive conditions. He maintained 
instead, that the learner is following "signs" to a goal. 
That he is learning "meanings" not movements, Tolman also 
developed constructs around the proposition that the 
environment is "represented" within the individual and that 
it is to this representation the individual is reacting in 
the learning situation. This representation has been des­
cribed as the "cognitive map." In the learning situation 
the relationships between the goal and the "signs" are 
developed in terms of this cognitive representation of the 
environment.
The most important aspect of Tolman*s point of view 
for our present purposes is his oonstruot of "sign- 
gestalt expectation," With this oonstruot Tolman argued 
directly against the ooncept that the direction of an 
organismTs behavior can be predicted in terms of simple
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movement toward a reward. Rather, behavior and changes in 
behavior were seen as the result of the building up of 
intra-individual expectancies that given behaviors will 
lead to attainment of a goal object. This construct was 
developed in relation to experiments by Tinklepaugh (42), 
Elliot (15), and Cowles and Nissen (10) in which it was 
noted that when a less preferred goal objeot was substi­
tuted, the animal rejected the object and resorted to 
searching behavior. These experiments have been inter­
preted as indicating that the organism develops expectan­
cies in regard to specific goal objects, that he is not 
just moving in the direction of a reward. This contention 
has been further supported by experiments in place learning 
such as those of Tolman, Ritchie, and Kalish (44), (45), 
(46) whioh indioate that the position of the goal objeot 
in spaoe is a more important factor in learning than the 
particular movement-sequenoes involved in obtaining the 
reward.
For Tolman, therefore, the faot that a reward is 
present is not enough to allow us to prediot behavior. The 
reward must become a part of the cognitive representation 
of the environment, and the particular movements or behav­
ior in obtaining the reward can best be predioted in terms 
of the organism*s expectanoy that a particular behavior 
will lead to the reward.
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The construct of expectancy was also dealt with by 
Kreohevsky (30), (31), who reported a series of experiments 
in whioh the results were interpreted as indicating that 
in the pre-solution activity of the organism faced with a 
problem there were definite patterns of responses and 
response changes rather than a slow build-up of correct 
responses through trial and error and reinforcement, 
Kreohevsky labeled the systematic attempts at solution as 
"hypotheses," and reasoned that the organism is hypothe­
sizing and acting upon alternate hypotheses in regard to 
the goal situation. Thus for Kreohevsky, as for Tolman, 
the direction of behavior is to be understood and predicted, 
not in terms of the association of stimulus and response 
in combination with drive and reward, but in terms of the 
successive trying out of various hypotheses concerning the 
relation of the organism to the goal object. The attain­
ment of the goal has the effect of validating the hypo­
thesis, not of strengthening the bond between various 
stimuli and responses.
In human learning Humphreys * experiments (27), (28) 
have been interpreted as being favorable to an antioipatory 
point of view. In the experiments Humphreys found that 
conditioning was established through partial, random rein­
forcement as quickly as through uniform reinforcement, and 
also that it was more resistive to extinction. Humphreys 
reasoned that in the learning process expectancies or
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hypotheses were tried out and then validated or invali­
dated* He thus rejected the conception of learning in 
terms of the establishment of S-R connections*
In Lewin*s (33) approach, also, the expectancy con­
struct assumed great importance. Lewin, like Tolman, 
placed great emphasis on the individuals internal repre­
sentation of the environment, labelling it "psychological 
space." In dealing with behavior, Lewin felt it was 
important to consider the individual*s perception of his 
position, in the psychological spaoe, in relation to the 
goal. This position was construed in terms of his expec­
tancy of achieving the goal. Thus not only the value or 
"valence" of the goal was considered important in determin­
ing the behavior in relation to it, but also the expectancy 
of a given behavior resulting in its attainment. The 
effect of this construct has been studied primarily in 
teims of the now familiar level of aspiration procedure.
In summing up the role of the oonstruot of anticipa­
tion or, in this oase, expeotanoy in relation to Tolman*s 
learning theory, Hilgard (25, p. 276) wrote:
"The following aspeots are all relevant (to 
the oonstruot of expeotanoy): (1) The organism
brings to a problematic situation various syste­
matic modes of attaok, based largely on prior 
experiences. (2) The cognitive field is provi­
sionally organized according to the hypotheses of 
the learner, the hypotheses whioh survive being 
those whioh best correspond with reality, that is, 
with the causal texture of the environment.
These hypotheses or expectancies are confirmed by
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successes in goal achievement. (3) A clearly 
established cognitive structure is available for 
use under altered conditions, as when a frequently 
used path is blooked. This availability of cogni­
tive structure distinguishes it from habit 
strength, for whioh transfer possibilities are 
limited."
As we mentioned at the outset, however, the use of the 
oonstruot of anticipation has not been limited to the area 
of learning theory* Since perception in itself is gener­
ally handled in terms of a oognitive interpretation we 
would expeot to find perceptual theorists utilizing suoh a 
construct.
Blake and Ramseyfs book (5) provides ample evidence of 
the role whioh the construct of anticipation, hypothesis, 
or expectancy plays in relation to perceptual theory. Per­
haps the clearest statement of the use of the oonstruot in 
a perceptual framework is that of Bruner (7). In discus­
sing personality and behavior, Bruner mentions that the 
theorist must take into account the perceptual processes 
of the individual. The peroeptual process itself, however, 
i3 to be understood in terms of the expectancies whioh the 
individual has developed. In Bruner's words: "Basically
perception involves a three-step cycle. Analytically we 
may say that peroeiving begins with an expeotanoy or 
hypothesis.” (7, p. 125) The second and third steps are 
conceptualized as the reception of information from the 
environment and the confirmation or changing of the hypoth­
esis as a result of the information received. Bruner then
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proceeds to discuss various aspects of hypotheses suoh as 
their strength, elicitation, and change.
The important point in Bruner's work for our present 
purposes is that the perceptual prooess is linked intimate­
ly with a construction of the individual in anticipatory 
terms. The individual is seen as not simply reacting to an 
environment, but is actively attempting to form hypotheses 
and make predictions about it. Furthermore, his behavior 
is seen as closely related to his anticipations.
Cameron (8), (9), in discussing behavior pathology, 
al3o relies at certain points in his development on the 
notion of the individual as an anticipator. He also 
relates the anticipations to the perceptual activities of 
the individual. Acoording to Cameron, most of the inform­
ation we have about the environment is incomplete. This 
forces the individual to supplement what facts he has about 
the environment with inferences or hypotheses. The behav­
ior in relation to a situation is thus a function of the 
individual's reaction to what he knows about the situation 
in combination with what he must infer about it. In his 
own words: rt...we are perceptually responding to ongoing
activity, to behavior that we must prediot, as we respond, 
in terms of what we anticipate." (9, p. 292) Thus for 
Cameron, also, the role of anticipation is an important one 
in understanding and predicting behavior.
In discussing the use of the oonstruot of anticipa­
tion by Lewin, Bruner, and Cameron we limited the disous- 
sion to the rather specific areas of learning, perception, 
and pathology respectively. However, since these theorists 
have also utilized the same oonstruot in terms of a more 
general approach to personality we might have disoussed 
them in this light. Another approaoh in which the con­
struct of expectancy has been used in the more inclusive 
framework of personality is to be found in that of Rotter 
(58). Rotter's theory can be viewed as an attempt to 
utilize both the oonstruots of expeotanoy and reinforcement 
in a single approaoh. According to Rotter both expeotanoy 
and reinforcement play a role in the establishment or 
exhibition of behavior in that the oocurrenoe of a given 
behavior is seen as a function of both the expectancy that 
it will lead to a given reward and the value of that reward 
for the individual. An important point for Rotter's 
approaoh is the proposition that the expectancy of the 
oocurrenoe of any given reward is measurable and can be 
quantified. Much of the research done within his system 
has been directed to the problem of the measurement of 
expeotanoy strength and ohanges in expeotanoy strength as a 
result of experience.
Our discussion of the use of the construct of antici­
pation oould prooeed much further than we have gone so far.
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We have not included suoh well-known concepts as "set" and 
the "learning to learn" principle developed in relation to 
Harlowers work. Also, many authors suoh as Dewey (14), 
Asoh(2), and Allport and Postman (3) have disoussed the 
idea that man might be viewed as searching after meaning 
or clarity in his environment. These points of view could 
be related to the notion of anticipation. However, as we 
originally stated, we believe an exhaustive account of the 
concept would require a volume in itself, and we thus 
deoided to content ourself with an illustrative review at 
this time.
It is interesting to note at this point the major 
differences between Kelly’s use of the oonstruot of anti­
cipation and that of the other theorists which we have dis­
oussed, In all of the theories with which we have been 
dealing, behavior has been seen as directed toward a goal 
of one type or another whioh is sought because it is 
rewarding to the organism. Anticipation or expeotanoy has 
been viewed as functioning in terms of its determination of 
how the organism will learn to approaoh the goal (Tolman, 
Kreohevsky), and also in determining whether or not it will 
approaoh it (Lewin, Rotter), But for Kelly, anticipation, 
or the extension of the ability to anticipate, is the goal 
itself. The individual is seen as moving toward an objeot 
or person not because that objeot is in some hedonistio
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sense a reward to the individual, but because it is seen or 
predicted as offering an opportunity for the extension of 
the individuals prediction system to an ever-widening 
series of events. Anticipation is thus for Kelly a basic 
construct and as suoh appears in the basic postulate of the 
system.
0onoeptu al1zation and Behavior
From our discussion of personal oonstruot theory the 
similarities between a personal construct and the more 
general notion of a concept have, I am sure, become quite 
apparent. It is interesting, however, that in Kelly*s des­
cription of the relationship hypothesized to exist between 
the individual*s constructs and anticipations the func­
tional role of personal constructs is explicitly defined. 
This is a decidedly different method of approaoh to con­
ceptualization than has been taken by most theorists and 
experimental workers attempting to deal with the idea of 
conceptualization. It is for this reason that Kelly has 
utilized the term "construct** instead of the more tradi­
tional "concept." Historically, those interested in oon­
oepts and conceptualization have restricted their interests 
and experimental procedures almost entirely to the pro­
cesses by whioh concepts are developed. There has been a 
distinct paucity of experimental work dealing with either 
the content of oonoepts or the functional role of concepts
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in relation to behavior. Heidbreder’s statement (24) seems
to represent best this traditional approaoh:
Thus, concepts are not the subject matter inves­
tigated in psychological research; they are among 
the means by whioh certain psychological activi­
ties may be investigated. An experimenter intro­
duces oonoepts into the experimental situation in 
the sense that he arranges conditions with respeot 
to them.... Procedures, apparatus, kinds of 
observations and measures employed are determined 
by the oonoepts used.
Sinoe reviews by Yinaoke (49), MoGaughran (34), and Pooh 
(36) have adequately covered the literature in regard to 
the problems and methodologies involved in the study of 
oonoept formation we will confine ourselves to those 
approaches dealing with the more functional aspeots of oon­
oepts.
In general the functional interpretations of individ­
ual concepts has been developed in terms of "conceptual 
levels." The use of the term in psychology has generally 
reflected the division of oonoepts into those that are 
arrived at by the individual in an abstractive fashion and 
those that refleot a less abstractive or a "oonoretistic" 
conceptual approach. The degree of differentiation 
hypothesized to exist between concepts has ranged from the 
rather strict dichotomization of abstract and concrete 
levels by Goldstein (16), through the four-level quasi- 
oontinuum of Bolles (6), to the "conceptual areas" of 
MoGaughran (34). Other contributions to the notion of
levels of conceptualization have "been made by Vigotsky 
(48), Weigl (50), Rapaport and his associates (37), and 
Hanfmann and Kasanin (19), (20),
Descriptions of the theoretioal and methodological 
aspects of the approaches of these workers oan be found in 
MoGaughran’s paper, so for our present purposes we will 
restrict ourselves to the interpretations whioh these 
workers have made regarding the role of the various levels 
of conceptualization in determining the behavior of the 
individual.
Goldstein (16) has disoussed conceptualization in 
terms of a dichotomy of what he terms abstract and con­
crete "attitudes.” In describing the relation of these 
"attitudes" to behavior, he states:
In the oonorete attitude we are given over 
passively and bound to the immediate experience 
of unique objects or situations. Our thinking 
and acting are determined by the immediate 
claims made by the particular aspect of the 
objeot or situation. (16, p. 6)
In regard to acting abstractively:
We transcend the immediately given specific 
aspects of sense impressions, we detaoh our­
selves from the latter and consider the situa­
tion from a conceptual point of view and act 
accordingly. Our actions are determined not so 
much by the objects before us as by the way we 
think about them; the individual thing beoomes a 
mere accidental example or representative of a 
*oategory’•••. The abstract attitude is basic 
for the following potentialities:
1. Assuming a mental set voluntarily, taking
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initiative, even ‘beginning a performance on 
demand.
2. Shifting voluntarily from one aspect of a 
situation to another, making a ohoioe.
3. Keeping in mind simultaneously various aspects 
of a situation; reacting to two stimuli whioh 
do not belong intrinsically together.
4. Grasping the essential of a given whole, 
breaking up a given whole into parts, iso­
lating them voluntarily, and combining them 
to wholes.
5. Abstracting common properties, planning ahead 
ideationally, assuming an attitude toward the 
♦merely possible,* and thinking or performing 
symbolically.
6. Detaching the ego from the outer world.
For Goldstein, therefore, the conceptual level or 
attitude under whioh one is operating has definite influ­
ences upon the behavior. It should be pointed out, how- 
ever, that Goldstein*s differentiations were made in terms 
of normal vs. brain-damaged persons. Although he did dis­
tinguish various degrees of abstract and concrete behavior, 
he implied that all normals would exhibit the abstract 
attitude. Concretism was seen as a function of brain 
damage. Goldstein's approaoh is thus limited if we attempt 
to apply it to the differentiation of members within a 
relatively homogeneous group. To this same degree it is 
also limited as a more general approach to behavior.
Weigl (50), a student of Goldstein, also utilizes the 
abstract-concrete dichotomization, only labelling what
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Goldstein had termed the abstract attitude the "oategor- 
ioal" attitude. He describes the concrete attitude as 
nresponding concretely to a stimulus configuration within 
a definite unrefleotively experienced sphere," So long as 
the conceptual behavior remains on this level "we can react 
to organizations of this sphere and not to organizations of 
any other sphere." Thus the brain-damaged patient is seen 
as laoking principles of classification such as are found 
in categorical behavior, "...the organization and grouping 
are not superimposed upon the objects to be sorted; but 
rather he experiences them from the outset as organized and 
grouped in a definite way." Thus, those persons approach­
ing objects in a oonoretistio manner are unable to shift 
their categorization of the objects except under conditions 
of extreme "coercion." Weigl felt that the conditions 
under whioh suoh a shift ooours could be Used to differ­
entiate concrete from categorical behavior, and he devel­
oped a well known sorting test on the basis of this belief*
In addition to differentiating brain-damaged from 
"normals," Weigl also considered the conceptualization of 
children. He reported that children tend to build stories 
around the objects, grouping them in conceptual "chains" 
coinciding with the stories. He concluded that this is 
oonoretistio to the highest extent.
With Weiglrs work, therefore, we see an extension of
the application of the abstract-concrete diohotomization 
to children. However the approaoh is still in terms of 
differentiating large classes of persons. The limitations 
in regard to differentiating more homogeneous groups are 
still present.
Bolles (6) contrasted such groups as aments, dements, 
and normal children in terms of their conceptual behavior 
as measured by several sorting tests. She found that 
normal children of about nine years of age were capable of 
both conorate and abstract behavior. In comparing normals 
to the other groups she found that the aments and dements 
oould not voluntarily snift their conceptualization of 
objects from one principle to another. She oonoluded that 
the major differentiation between concrete and categorical 
attitudes lies in the inability of those utilizing a con­
crete approaoh to shift their point of view from some 
detail of the objects dealt with. Conceptualization is 
directed toward the concrete thing in its uniqueness or 
upon some usability in a concrete situation.
Bolles rejected Goldstein’s diohotomization as a 
satisfactory way of dealing with conceptualization, and 
suggested instead a continuum which moves from the "level 
of identity," or pertinence on the basis of exact sensory 
equivalence, through "partial identity” and "co-function­
ality" to "categorical similarity." "Co-functionality"
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depends upon the relationship among the objects seen in 
terms of their being used together in a speoifio situation, 
whole oonoeptualization in terms of "categorical similar­
ity” is equivalent to Goldstein*s abstract attitude in 
which objects are accidental representatives of a general 
class* In reference to the continuum she says: "As may be
seen these types constitute a series in which there are 
more and more discrepancies between the objects classed 
together* In other words to see any basic similarity 
between objects in the 'categorical similarity* classifica­
tion, it is necessary to overlook a wide range of dis­
crepancies between the objects." (6, p, 46)
Vigotsky (48), working separately from Goldstein, and
utilizing slightly different methods and concepts, also 
developed a dichotomous approach to thinking which he 
termed "conceptual" and "preoonceptual," the latter char­
acterized in terms of what he called "complexes."
Vigotsky, however, worked with schizophrenics and pre- 
adolescent groups. He reported that both groups are char­
acterized by "complex" thinking.
Vigotsky ooncemed himself less with the effects of 
these types of thinking on behavior than Goldstein had in 
relation to his categories. However, Hanfmann (18), and 
Hanfmann and Kasanin (19), (20) further developed 
Vigotsky*s concepts in terms of their effects on the
behavior of the individual. Most of Hanfmann and Kasanin’s 
studies have dealt with the characteristics of schizo­
phrenic thought, and during the process of these studies 
they, as had Bolles in relation to Goldstein’s work, found 
a strict dichotomy somewhat unsatisfactory for character­
izing the conceptual behavior of their subjects. They 
therefore postulated three levels of thinking which they 
termed as "primitive," "intermediate,” and "conceptual."
IFor our particular purposes, however, Hanfmann’s (18) work 
is particularly pertinent. Heretofore, all of the studies 
dealing with levels of ooncepts have attempted to differ­
entiate various subclasses or diagnostic categories from 
normal subjects. In this study, however, Hanfmann dealt 
wholely with the performance of superior normal adults whom 
she had used in previous studies. In analyzing the per­
formance of this group Hanfmann found they could be divided 
into two types; the "conceptual" and "perceptual." The 
conceptual group was characterized by a tendency to "reason 
out" the Vigotsky sorting problem with little manipulation 
of the blocks. The perceptual group showed a tendency to 
look at and manipulate the blocks and often arrived at a 
solution before they could verbalize it.
Hanfmann further reasoned that in some individuals 
these approaches work together to form a "concordant" 
pattern while in others they work together to form a
"discordant” pattern. The former group was ahle to com­
plete the Vigotsky test in about one-half the length of 
time it took the latter group. Hanfmann1s procedure is 
important in that it is ;the first attempt to show differ­
ences in conceptual approach within a more or less homo­
geneous population rather than differences between various 
group classifications.
It is interesting to point out at this time that as 
the "level approaoh” has been applied to more and more 
homogeneous groups there has been a tendenoy to designate 
more points on the continuum. Thus, while Goldstein and 
Vigotsky worked in relation to schizophrenic and normal 
groups, a strict dichotomy seemed appropriate. However, as 
workers applied the concept to less deviant groups they 
found it neoessary to establish finer points of differen­
tiation. The writer would argue that this illustrates the 
difficulties that are likely to arise when one attempts to 
generalize in terms of dimensions on which differences have 
been found in relation to widely divergent groups. Because 
one has found differences on some dimension between such 
groups is no basis for assuming that one has also found the 
basis for the divergency or deviancy itself.
Rapaport (37) has taken a somewhat different view of 
the functional aspects of conceptualization. First, he 
postulated several qualitatively different levels of
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concept formation. He termed three of these the "con­
crete," the "functional," and the "conceptual" levels.
The similarity between this and Bolles’ approach is ob­
vious. According to Rapaport, oonoept formation is "one of 
the intrinsio formal characteristics of human thinking."
It operates in thought at both a conscious and unoon- 
soious level. However, while thinking on the conscious 
level is ’’ordered" and "identifiable" (objects are clearly 
conceptualized, clearly related to other objects both past 
and present, and "anticipations" regarding them flow 
easily), thinking on the unconscious level is related to 
"primitive" thouight in the sense that it is at the feeling 
level; its characteristics are not reportable and there is 
a minimum relationship with the conscious functions of 
"anticipation," "attention," and "concentration." Rapaport 
then, following the psychoanalytic suggestion, postulates 
that maladjustment occurs when unconscious ideas (or con­
ceptual processes) dominate mental activity. This domina­
tion by unconscious ideas may impair active concept forma­
tion either by interferring with the conscious and directed 
functions of anticipation, attention, and concentration, or 
by interferring with the formation of the conscious knowl­
edge of relationships.
Thus in Rapaportfs work we see a different emphasis in 
that the oonstruot of unconscious and conscious concept
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formation is developed and utilized to explain maladjust­
ment, Furthermore, in his hypothesizing that unconscious 
concept formation interferes with oonsoious mental activity 
by interferring with the perception of relationships and the 
processes of anticipation, concentration, and attention, 
we are brought one step oloser to the relation between con­
cepts and behavior. This is in distinction from most 
writers who seem to assume that once one has discussed the 
nature of conceptualization, the nature of behavior is also 
discussed, ^ e  writer would argue that the relationships 
between the concepts and the behavior of the conceptualizer 
are a legitimate area of study and must be dealt with 
before a conceptual approaoh can be utilized with any suc­
cess,
MoGaughran^s work (34) is especially relevant to our 
present interests in that he specifically set out to 
examine the relationship between "conceptual levels" and 
various measures of language behavior. In the course of 
his study, however, he concluded that the approaches to 
conceptual behavior taken by the experimenters we have been 
discussing "could not be adapted to meet the requirements 
of universality and dimensionality.,.necessary for the 
formulation of a personality theory." He therefore 
rejected the abstract-concrete dichotomization and its 
variants and postulated that conceptual behavior might be
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construed in terms of Conceptual areas" demarcated by the 
intersection of the dimensions of "conceptual freedom" and 
"conceptual communioability." Conceptual freedom refers to 
the extent to which the ooncept will sustain the addition 
of new elements. The terminals of the dimension are 
designated "dosed" and "open-ended." The communioability 
dimension refers to the extent to which the ooncept group­
ings correspond to those commonly found in the individual*s 
culture and are therefore communicable to those about him. 
The terminals of this dimension are designated "private" 
and "public."
Working within the framework of the conceptual areas 
demarcated by the hypothesized intersection of these dimen­
sions McGaughran demonstrated that there is a relationship 
between the individual's conceptual behavior as measured 
by his performance on an object sorting test and his 
language behavior as measured by verbal performance in a 
picture interpretation situation. He also demonstrated 
that "conceptual behaviors previously collected under the 
term 'ooncretism* to identify a non-abstract conceptual 
level can be demonstrated to be more economically ordered 
to occur in two 'conceptual areas.'"
In a more recent article Adams (1) has taken issue 
with the traditional tendency of psychologist interested in 
conceptualization to deal primarily with the genetic
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aspects of eoncepts rather than the functional aspects.
This is, of oourse, our issue in the present study. He 
also points out that while those using the terminology of 
"concept” have restricted their experimentation to the 
developmental processes, others, using constructs such as 
"stereotypes," "schemata,” or "frames of reference" which 
are operationally quite similar to the construct of con­
ceptualization, have shown more interest in the functional 
aspeots of their constructs.
Adams then prooeeds to discuss various categorizations 
in terms of which conoepts may be analyzed. The cate­
gories are grouped in terms of the "content” and "formal 
properties" of concepts. The content categories deal with 
such factors as the "extensions" or objects which are 
related in terms of the concept, the "intensions" or 
properties which the individual perceives the objeots as 
having, and "expressors" or labels with which he designates 
his oonoepts* Further breakdowns are then made of cate­
gorizations.
The formal properties of concepts are described in 
such terms as "structure" or the number of groupings of 
objects which can be made in terms of a single concept and 
the relationships among these groupings (ordinal, interval, 
ratio), "decidability” or whether objects oan be clearly 
classified in terms of the oonoept, "availability" or the
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degree to whioh a ooncept will be used in relation to 
experiences with various objects, and other characteris­
tics. Adams holds that in using suoh formulations many of 
the studies dealing with cognitive phenomena can be ana­
lyzed more adequately. In summing up his position he 
states:
In addition to the many problems in the field 
of conoept formation which the foregoing delinea­
tions suggest, we oan state, using these distinc­
tions, in fairly precise form a rather comprehen­
sive set of theses about oognitive functioning as 
follows: Conoepts which are desoribable in terms
of formal properties and oontent play a demon­
strable role in the formation and organization 
of experience and behavior; the formal properties 
and content of frequent operators (oonoepts) are 
related to the personality structure of the indi­
vidual; the oontent and formal properties of the 
operators frequently used by members of a given 
culture are strongly related to the lexioon and 
grammar of the language used in the culture; poten­
tial dominators, i.e., oonoepts which if they 
operated would dominate, tend to be operators. If 
any of these theses is true the psychology of oon­
oepts overlaps with many other areas of psychology 
and has important implications for many other 
disciplines and applied fields. (1, p. 250)
In discussing any relationship between conceptuali­
zation and behavior, the work of self-concept theorists 
suoh as Raimy, Bugental, Rogers, Leoky, and Snygg and Combs 
is of oourse highly relevant. However, sinoe an excellent 
disoussion of this point of view is to be found in the 
study of Goodrich (17) we see no need for a thorough 
analysis here. Suffice it to say that these writers, in 
one manner or another, seleot the individual's self-conoept
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as the primary construot for explaining and predicting 
behavior. Most behavior is seen as a result of the indi­
vidual *s attempt to enhance or protect this self-concept. 
Because of the almost complete dependence on this single 
construct these approaches appear to have the failing of 
attempting to acoount for too much with too little. To 
attempt to predict much behavior on the basis of the rela­
tionship of the self-concept to the rest of the individ­
ual's conceptual or perceptual fieldseems somewhat un­
reasonable.
In summary, we can say that as a whole the studies 
dealing with concepts in their functional role have not 
been overly illuminating. The approaches utilizing con­
ceptual levels, while differentiating large sub-classes of 
individuals, have been much less useful when forced to 
make finer differentiations. Rapaport's work, while stim­
ulating much olinical interest, has not seemed to lead to 
any broad shifts in theoretical approach. Both McG-au^iran's 
and Adams* reports are too recent to evaluate in terms of 
their effects. In both oases their schema seem to be of 
value. However, in both oases the relationships between 
conceptual dimensions and behavior are rather vaguely 
drawn. In relation to this it should be remembered that 
Kelly has structured anticipation as the process interven­
ing between concepts or, in his terms, constructs and behav­
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ior. It is hoped that this will provide a useful method 
for moving from concepts to predictions of behavior. This 
is, of course, not unique, Rapaport as well as others 
have written concerning the effects of conceptualization on 
anticipation. However, Kelly’s approach is unique in the 
importance placed on the conceptualization construct and 
the position it occupies in the theoretical structure.
The Validity of Interpersonal Predictions
Two of the hypotheses whi(ch we have formulated in the 
present study are concerned with the validity of an indi­
vidual’s predictions. We have! hypothesized that a rela­
tionship exists between the validity of an individual’s 
predictions about other persons and his statements concern­
ing feelings of "comfort" in regard to them. We have also 
hypothesized that there exists a relationship between the 
amount of actual similarity (as measured by correspondence 
of behavioral ohoioes) among persons and their ability to 
predict one another. One of our hypotheses, the latter, 
can thus be seen as dealing with one of the factors which 
determine the validity of interpersonal predictions, while 
the other can be seen as dealing with one of the results of 
making valid or invalid predictions*
The number of faotors whioh psychologists have 
hypothesized to be related with the making of valid
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predictions is extremely large. A survey of the litera­
ture concerned with this problem was recently reported by 
Taft (41), In summarizing the studies Taft concludes:
Our review of the literature suggests that 
the following characteristics are fairly con­
sistently found to be positively correlated with 
the ability to judge the personality character­
istics of others: (a) age (ohildren), (b) high
intelligence and academic ability (with analytio 
judgments especially), (c) specialization in the 
physical sciences, (d) esthetic and dramatic 
interests, (3) insight into one’s status with 
respect to one’s peers on specific traits, (f) 
good emotional adjustment and integration 
(analytic tests only), and (g) social skill (only 
with tests of ability to predict S ’s behavior).
The ability to judge correlates negatively with 
J’s social dependence and his "psychasthenic" 
score on the MMPI. Characteristics showing fairly 
consistent lack of correlation are age (in adults), 
sex, and training in psychology.,..
The main attributes of the ability to judge 
others seem to lie in three areas: possessing
appropriate judgmental norms, judging ability, 
and motivation. (41, p. 20)
In considering these factors which have been hypothe­
sized to be related to the validity of interpersonal pre­
dictions it is interesting to note that nearly all of them 
are factors which might be considered personality char­
acteristics or experience of the predictor. The reader 
will remember that the present writer has argued that cer­
tain factors of the relationship between the predictor and 
the predicted person should also be considered, especially 
since it seems quite justifiable to reason that persons who 
are similar to one another might be expected to predict
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eaoh other more validly.
Taft does report several studies which suggest that 
the ability to judge others is related somewhat to the 
similarity in oultural backgrounds, age, and sex of the 
prediotor and the predicted. Hanks (21), for example, in 
using the ability to predict as a measure of the efficacy 
of a trait vs. type approaoh found that his poorest judge 
had been in this country only twelve years, arriving when 
he was twenty years old. This judge also stated that some 
of the subjects seemed completely strange and incompre­
hensible to him. Hanks therefore reasoned that "an 
acquaintance with the social norms" of the subject is 
important in making interpersonal judgments.
Wolf and Murray’s study (51) is important in that it 
contains the most direot test the present experimenter has 
encountered of the effect of similarity between judge and 
subject on predictive ability. In the process of studying 
the ability of five trained judges to predict the rating 
achieved by a group of subjects on various measures of 
personality, Wolf and Murray had each judge fill out the 
same questionnaire as that given to the subjects and also 
predict how eaoh other judge would complete it. A cri­
terion score for each judge was then determined by taking 
the rating assigned by the judge himself and averaging this 
with the average rating assigned to him by the four other
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judges. In this way the individual’s rating of himself was 
weighted more highly than others ’ ratings of him. A rough 
measure of the validity of eaoh judge’s predictions of the 
other judges was then obtained by matohing eaoh judge with 
the judges he most resembled and least resembled and then 
comparing this with the judges he predicted most validly 
and least validly. This was done for two sets of predic­
tions about each judge. Although no statistical test was 
made it was found that out of the twenty predictions, 
eleven were completely verified (those predicted best were 
most similar; those predicted worst were least similar). 
This study would seem to indicate that when aotual simi­
larity is measured in terms of the ratings on certain per­
sonality variables which are ascribed to an individual by 
himself and others there is a relationship between the 
similarity of persons and their ability to make valid pre­
dictions about one another. In Wolf and Murray’s study, 
as well as in Hanks’, the poorest judge was one unfamiliar 
with the oultural background of the subjeot.
Studies dealing with the effects of validation or 
invalidation on personality characteristics of the pre­
dictor are not to be found in the general literature. Some 
speculation concerning effects of validation and invalida­
tion on hypothesis strength or expectancies are found in 
such approaches as that of Bruner (7) mentioned earlier.
Those interested in the level of aspiration situation have 
completed some studies dealing with the effeots of the sub­
jects r inoorreot predictions of ability. However, these 
have generally dealt with rather speoifio behavior patterns 
rather than changes in general personality characteristics.
Several studies dealing with the effect of validation 
and invalidation of predictions on the personal construot 
system have been done within the framework of the psy­
chology of personal constructs. We will thus discuss these 
in the following section.
Relevant Studies Within Personal Construot Theory
In the sense that any study utilizing the oonstruots 
or hypothesized relations as described within a given 
theory can be considered as casting some light on the 
acceptability of that theory, we might consider all of the 
studies utilizing personal construot theory as their frame­
work as relevant to the present problem. However, since in 
the present study we are specifically concerned with the 
relationship between anticipation and construing and the 
effeots of validation and invalidation, we shall oonfine 
our review to these topics.
Both Trapp (47) and MoGaughran (34) made early 
attempts to show that the individuals conceptual system 
was related to various aspects of his behavior. Since we 
discussed MoGaughran*s paper in a previous seotion of this
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chapter we will oonfine the present discussion to Trapp’s 
presentation. Starting from a position similar to our own 
in that the direction of an individual’s psychological 
processes were seen as determined by a personal construc­
tion system which served as the "souroe from which the 
individual makes predictions," Trapp reasoned that he 
should find differences in the predictive ability of per­
sons in a given group related to their position on such 
intra-group dimensions as leadership, popularity, and 
threat. More specifically he tested the hypotheses that he 
would find a relationship between (1) how an individual was 
ranked as to leadership ability by the members of his group 
and his ability to predict their responses to a behavioral 
situations test, (2) how an individual was ranked by the 
other group members as to popularity and his tendency to 
select "preferred" responses when making sooial predictions 
about others, and (5) how an individual is ranked in terms 
of his "threat" value for the other members of the group 
and his tendency to select more undesirable responses in 
predicting the behavior of the group members. The relation­
ship between predictions of others’ behavior and these 
three group phenomena leadership, popularity, and threat 
were thus investigated by Trapp.
In testing these relationships Trapp developed a 
situations predictions test based on modifications of
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situations drawn from the Rosenzweig Picture Frustration 
Test. He obtained his predictions by having the subjects 
respond to this test as they believed they would act in the 
situations presented and then estimating how they believed 
the other subjects in the group would fill it out for them­
selves. The data as to the variables of leadership, popu­
larity, and threat were obtained through sociometric 
technique.
In summarizing his findings Trapp concluded,
The study clearly supports the theory that 
there is operative within eaoh of the subjects in 
the group studied a predictive system which in 
execution exhibits some form of a general pattern.
It has been possible to show that the efficiency 
of these systems vary (sio) considerably among 
the subjects, and that such group attributes as 
leadership, popularity, and threat are related to 
them. (47, p. 144)
Thus Trapp, starting from a position similar to our own,
although emphasizing the anticipatory aspects, was able to
show that meaningful group process can be related to
various aspects of interpersonal anticipation. This would
seem to strengthen the position that man can be profitably
viewed as an anticipator.
Shoemaker (40) completed a study in which he attempted
to demonstrate that there is an observable relationship
between an individual’s personal constructs and his
observed behavior. In testing this hypothesis he first had
two groups of subjects complete an early form of the RORT.
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The verbal oonstruots from eaoh subject were then grouped 
according to apparent similarity and given to judges along 
with two dummy protocols obtained from other persons of 
similar background to the subjeots. The judges next 
observed each subject in a role-play situation and 
attempted to select that protocol from the three given them 
that belonged to the subject they were observing. Shoe­
maker’s results were partially supportive of his hypothesis 
in that in relation to one of his groups the judges were 
able to match the protocols and behavior significantly 
better than ohance (p .02). He attempted to explain the 
failure of the seoond group on the basis of a different 
procedure of administration for the RORT. He oonoluded 
that his results were tentatively supportive of the hypoth­
esis.
The value of Shoemaker's results was limited by the 
faot that they threw no light on the subject of what 
aspects of personal construction were related to behavior. 
When asked on what bases they had been able to make their 
successful matchings the judges were unable to speoify any 
consistent faotors. This is, of course, a limitation of 
many experiments involving the matching technique. Never­
theless, if one accepts Shoemaker's results as supportive 
of his original hypothesis, then, as with Trapp's experi­
ment, further support is given to the position that it is
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profitable to construe the individual in terms of a per­
sonal construot system.
In disoussing Trapp's experiment, we mentioned that he 
was able to demonstrate a relationship between the validity 
of an individual's predictions of the responses of other 
members of a group on a situations prediction test and 
these same group members ' ranking of him in terms of lead­
ership ability. Pooh (36) also dealt with the problem of 
validity and invalidity of predictions but in terms of 
their effects on the personal construct system. Like 
Trapp, Pooh had her subjeots make predictions as to how 
certain other persons would fill out a questionnaire.
Poch, however, had before this instructed her subjects to 
complete a modified form of the RORT, and she then asked 
her subjeots to indicate which of their constructs pro­
duced on the RCRT they had used in making eaoh prediction. 
She also divided her subjeots into two groups; those whose 
predictions she validated and those whose predictions she 
invalidated, Validation and invalidation were operation­
ally defined as telling a subject either that his predic­
tions had been largely correct or largely incorrect.
Three weeks after this first prediction situation eaoh sub- 
jeot was again asked to complete an RCRT, to predict the 
behavior of the same persons again, and to state which con­
structs he had used this time in making his predictions.
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From this procedure Pooh hoped to obtain information as to 
whether or not (1) use of constructs in making predictions 
would lead to more changes in the constructs than would 
non-use, (2) change in constructs used in making predic­
tions would be related to whether the predictions based on 
them had been validated or invalidated, and (3) validated 
constructs would tend to be used in making further predic­
tions while invalidated constructs would tend to be dropped. 
Her results clearly supported the hypothesis that con­
structs utilized in making invalidated predictions would 
tend to be dropped in making future predictions* She re­
ceived tentative support for the hypothesis that invalida­
tion of predictions would lead to a larger number of 
ohanges in the construot system than would validation. The 
hypothesis that ohanges in the construot system would be 
related to use or non-use of the constructs was not sup­
ported, but Pooh reasoned that her design provided an 
inadequate test of this hypothesis in that by inoluding 
validation and invalidation she automatically ruled out the 
possibility of clearly testing the effeots which utiliza­
tion of a oonstruot in making a prediction had upon the 
oonstruot system. In other words this phenomenon would 
have to be tested in isolation of the effects of validation 
and invalidation.
Pooh's study is particularly relevant to our present
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study in that she prooeeded, as we have done, from the 
assumption that there is a relationship between an indi­
vidual^ predictions and his personal constructs* Also, 
her finding that changes in construction occur when predic­
tions are invalidated can be seen as related to our 
hypothesis that such changes will often be acoompanied by 
reports of feelings of discomfort. Pooh’s and the present 
study may thus be seen as complementary in the light they 
throw on the confidence with which personal construct 
theory can be accepted.
One of the difficulties in PoohTs study, however, is 
the fact that her subjects predicted the responses of 
others in only ten verbally described situations. Also, 
the behavior involved in all but one of the situations was 
verbal behavior. The present writer would argue that since 
we are generalizing to behavior in everyday situations we 
need both a larger sample of interpersonal predictions and 
predictions as to motor as well as verbal behavior. This 
same critioism would hold for Trapp’s study in which only 
five situations were used.
In Bieri’s (4) and in Levy’s (32) studies we find what 
might be termed elaborations of the notion that validation 
and invalidation of interpersonal predictions can be shown 
to have effeots on the personal construot system. Bieri
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considered the effeots of validation and invalidation in 
terms of generalization of changes along the figure and 
construct dimensions. Thus, he predicted that changes pro­
duced in the construot system as a result of validation and 
invalidation of predictions, both in terms of oonstruots 
and in terms of the figures construed, would generalize to 
other constructs or figures of the system in the form of 
gradients based on the similarity to the constructs or 
figures involved in the validated or invalidated predic­
tions* In testing this he utilized a design similar to 
Pooh's. After administering a modified version of the RCRT 
he had his subjeots make predictions about the behavior of 
certain of their classmates and also indicate the oon­
struots they were using in making their predictions. Then 
he told them that on one set of predictions they were 
accurate while on another they were inaccurate. He then 
had them fill out the RCRT grid or matrix again using the 
same oonstruots as before but allowing his subjeots freedom 
to reoonstrue the figures. By utilizing the grid form of 
the RCRT he was able to ascertain the similarity of con­
structs with one another and the similarity of figures in 
terms of how they were construed. As had Pooh, Bieri found 
more changes in the constructs to result from invalidation 
of prediction than from validation. The results also sug­
gested that many of his predictions as to the generalize-
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tion and direction of change in the oonstruot system as a 
result of invalidation of interpersonal predictions were 
supported. His results suggested that in making group pre­
dictions, the oonstruot of generalization was a useful 
dimension to utilize in conceptualizing and predicting the 
amount and direction of change in the construct system 
resulting from invalidation of predictions, but that the 
amount of individual variation in generalization was so 
high that prediction on an individual basis would require 
further research.
Levy (32), like Bieri, was concerned with the problem 
of measuring and predicting the nature of the changes which 
occur in the personal oonstruot system as a result of 
invalidation of predictions. He conceptualized the problem 
in terms of certain oonoepts from information theory and in 
terms of Kelly's concept dimension of constellatory and 
propositional constructs. The oonstellatory-propositional 
dimension refers to the degree to which construction of an 
event in terms of one oonstruot "fixes" the event in rela­
tion to other constructs. Thus a person who is construed 
as a "businessman” is by many persons also more or less 
automatically construed as grasping, economy minded, insen­
sitive, hard, etc. Propositionality refers to that end of 
the dimension where other real memberships of the element 
or event are not fixed by its oonstruotion in a certain 
way, while constellatory refers to that end where the other
realm memberships of the element are fixed in relation to 
many other oonstruots. Thus a oonstruot used proposi- 
tionally does not tend to "fix” the element or event in 
relation to other constructs while one used in a oonstella- 
tory manner does.
Levy reasoned that since oonstellatory constructs 
would show a greater degree of intercorrelation among their 
elements, they should be judged to provide more information 
value for the individual and that ohanges in one of these 
oonstruots should lead to a larger amount of change in 
behavior related to this construct than should ohanges in 
propositional oonstruots. He also gave controlled differ­
ential amounts of invalidation in relation to his subjects’ 
predlotions, reasoning, as had Poch and Bieri, that more 
change in oonstruotion would result from a high amount of 
invalidation than from a low amount of invalidation.
In testing his hypotheses Levy first administered the 
grid form of the HCRT to eaoh of his subjects and then 
analyzed the protocols by using Kelly’s nonparametric 
faotorial analysis (29, Chap. 6). He operationally defined 
oonstellatory oonstruots as those showing a significant 
loading on the general faotor extracted from the individ­
ual’s protocol and propositional oonstruots as those not 
showing a significant loading on this factor. He then 
selected 5 oonstellatory and 5 propositional oonstruots
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from eaoh subject's RORT. These ten oonstruots from eaoh 
subject's protocol were then used as dimensions in terms of 
which the subject was to describe two persons whose photo­
graphs were shown to him. In the experimental session eaoh 
subject was shown the photographs of two persons and was 
asked to describe them in terms of the ten construct dimen­
sions which had been extracted from his RCRT, He was then 
asked to make 15 predictions as to the behavior of these 
persons. After the subject had made his prediotions, the 
experimenter went through the motions of "scoring" the pre­
dictions, finally telling the subjeot that he had predicted 
reasonably well in relation to one of the persons and 
poorly in relation to the other. He was then instructed to 
reexamine his constructions of the two persons, making any 
ohanges he wished, and to attempt once again to prediot 
their behavior. In this way the relative effeots of high 
and low invalidation could be determined on both oonstruo­
tion and prediction. Following this the subjeot was told 
that oertain of his constructions of the individual were 
inadequate ("You described this person as friendly, he is 
actually unfriendly."). In relation to one of the persons 
they were predicting oonstellatory constructs were so 
treated and in relation to the other propositional con­
structs were designated as inadequate. The subjeot was 
then asked to make another set of predictions about the
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same persons. In this way the differential effect of foro- 
ing reconstruction on propositional and oonstellatory oon­
struots could be measured. As a final step, the individual 
made a paired comparison of his 5 oonstellatory and 5 pro- 
positional oonstruots, stating in relation to each pair 
whioh oonstruot he felt provided the most information upon 
which he could base his prediotions.
In testing his hypotheses, Levy developed 10 experi­
mental predictions of which 7 were supported at acceptable 
levels of significance. In general, his results supported 
his hypotheses that greater ohanges in both constructs and 
prediotions would follow high invalidation than low invalid­
ation, that greater ohanges in prediction would follow 
reconstruction on oonstellatory constructs than would fol­
low reconstruction on propositional constructs, and that 
oonstellatory constructs would be rated as providing more 
information value than would propositional constructs.
In the experiments of Poch, Bieri, and Levy we there­
fore find three studies in which it has been assumed that 
an individuals predictions are determined by his con­
structs, and where hypotheses have been developed and 
largely confirmed as to the effeots on the construct sys­
tem of the reception of validational and invalidational 
evidence as regard to prediction. In a sense, therefore, 
these studies offer confirmation as to the utility of
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making the assumption that constructs and predictions are 
related. However, certain procedures in these experiments 
should make us cautious about regarding them as confirma­
tory in regard to the assumption. It should be noted that 
having assumed constructs and prediction to be related, 
each of these experimenters in some manner then presented 
the subject with his constructs, thus relating construc­
tion and prediction within the experimental situation. By 
asking the subject which constructs he had used in making 
his predictions, Pooh forced her subjects to react in terms 
of the constructs obtained on the RCRT. In both Bieri’s 
and Levy's studies the subjects were instructed to make 
their predictions in terms of the constructs they had pro­
duced, These experiments can thus offer us only rather 
tenuous evidence as to the tenability of the assumption 
that an individual's constructs determine his predictions. 
In order to provide direct information in regard to the 
assumption the two experiences of construction and pre­
diction must be separated in the experimental situation.
The present study has been designed with this in mind. 
Summary
Our review of the literature, while far from exhaus­
tive, has indicated that the constructs of anticipation and 
conceptualization have been utilized in many approaches to 
psychological problems. In nearly every case, however,
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they have been relegated by the theorist to ancillary 
rather than basic positions in the theoretical structure. 
This is especially true in regard to conceptualization. 
Furthermore, the research in regard to conceptualization 
has dealt predominately with conoept formation rather than 
the influences of an individual’s concepts upon his behav­
ior. The research in regard to anticipation or expectancy 
has dealt primarily with the question of whether or not we 
can usefully construe the organism as one whose expec­
tancies of the occurrence of certain rewarding or punish­
ing events are related to his behavior in regard to these 
events. The effects of invalidation and validation of 
these expectancies have been dealt with primarily only in 
terms of the occurrence or non-oocurrenoe of movement 
toward a specifio goal. Only in the studies working within 
the framework of personal oonstruot theory have we found 
attempts to relate the effects of validation and invalida­
tion to more global personality constructs.
Personal oonstruot theory would thus appear somewhat 
unique in the emphasis which it places on the constructs 
of anticipation and conceptualization and the relationship 
which it assumes to exist between these two constructs. In 
the following chapter we shall report the methodology we 
have used to provide the data from which we hope to be able 
to evaluate more adequately the tenability of this approach.
CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Design Specifications
The reader will remember that we have set oat to test 
four hypotheses developed within the framework of personal 
oonstruot theory. Our speoifio predictions were (l) that 
we would find a relationship between construing persons as 
similar and predicting that these same persons will behave 
similarly, (2) that the correlation between similarity of 
construction and similarity of prediction will not differ 
significantly when similarity of construction is measured 
by correspondence of RCRT grid checks and when it is 
measured by correspondence of RCRT grid voids, (3) that 
persons will state that they feel most "oomfortable” with 
those individuals whom they can predict most validly, and
(4) that persons will predict most validly those individ­
uals whom they most resemble in their behavioral choices. 
From the hypotheses that we have made it can be seen 
that we need to obtain five basic measures from each sub­
ject used in the experiment. These are (1) a measure of 
how similarly eaoh subject construes certain other persons 
in terms of his construct system, (2) a measure of how 
similarly eaoh subject predicts these same persons will
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behave in given choice situations, (3) a measure of how 
validly eaoh subject predicts the behavior of these same 
persons, (4) a measure of how "comfortable" he feels with 
the persons about whom he is making his predictions, and
(5) a measure of how similar, in terms of behavioral 
choices, he is to the persons he is predicting* We shall 
now discuss the methods used to obtain eaoh of these 
measures.
Similarity of Construction
In chapter 2 (p. 9 ff.) we discussed in rather general 
form the prooesses involved in using the grid form of the 
RCRT to obtain a measure of how similarly the individual 
construes given persons within his environment. For our 
particular measure, however, we deviated slightly from 
this general procedure. Since we wished to have measures 
of how similarly certain persons were construed, how simi­
larly they were predicted to behave, and how validly they 
were predicted it was necessary to include in the role 
title list persons from whom we could obtain the valida- 
tional evidence. This meant that we must have the individ­
ual construing and predicting persons who were also avail­
able to us. We thus chose these persons from the subjects’ 
immediate environment, disoarded several of the figures 
used in the general form of the RCRT role title list, and 
inserted blank spaces where the names of the persons from
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the subject*s immediate environment could be inserted. The 
final role title list was composed of fifteen figures, five 
of whom were to represent persons in the subject*s immedi­
ate environment (the role title list finally utilized can 
be seen in appendix B).
Furthermore, to increase the possibility that the con­
structs formed would be applicable to the persons about 
whom the subject was to make his predictions, one of these 
persons was included as one of the figures in each triad- 
sort. The necessity for this can be seen if we consider 
that a oonstruot formed, say, on the subjeot*s mother, 
father, and a teacher, might not be applicable in making 
predictions about peers. We thus wished to insure that the 
persons whom the subject was to predict fell within the 
"range of convenience" of the constructs elioited on our 
form of the test. The figures were included in the con­
struct sorts in a random fashion.
The form of the RCRT used (see appendix B for a sample 
of the form used in the present study), then, consisted of 
22 oonstruot sorts formed of fifteen role figures, five of 
whom were persons within the subjects* immediate environ­
ment.
Measures of how similarly certain persons were con­
strued by each subject were taken only in relation to the 
five persons chosen from the individual*s immediate
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environment. To obtain the measures of how similarly the 
subject construed these persons, his constructions of each 
of them were compared to his constructions of the other 
four, thus giving us measures of how similarly ten pairs of 
persons were construed by eaoh subject. The amount of 
similarity with which any two persons were construed was 
determined by counting the number of times of the 28 con­
struct sorts the subjeot plaoed checks or voids in the 
oells corresponding to both persons. Since there were 22 
sorts it was possible for any two persons to be oonstrued 
similarly as few as 0 times and as many as 22 times.
Three methods of measuring similarity of construction 
were used in the study. These were (1) correspondence of 
ohecks alone, (2) correspondence of voids alone, and (3) 
correspondence of checks and voids taken together. The 
latter measure was utilized except in testing the second 
hypothesis.
In summary, by utilizing a modified form of the RCRT 
we obtained a measure of how similarly a subjeot oonstrued 
five other persons compared two at a time. This meant that 
his constructions of ten pairs of persons were compared.
For each pair three measures were obtained of how similarly 
eaoh pair was oonstrued. Each pair could be seen as simi­
lar on from 0 to 22 oonstruot sorts as determined by each 
method of measuring similarity of construction. Thus a
total of 30 similarity of construction "scores" was ob­
tained from each subject used in the study.
Similarity of Prediction
Traditionally, those experimenting with various 
factors involved in interpersonal prediction have used two 
methods of structuring the prediction "test." In many 
experiments the predictor has been asked to respond to a 
personality inventory or questionnaire as he thinks another 
person will respond to it. These have been labeled as 
"empathy" tests and have been used extensively by Dymond 
(12), (13). The other method has been to have the predic­
tor make predictions about how another person would behave 
if faoed with a number of situations considered representa­
tive of normal day-to-day living. In this latter proce­
dure, utilized by Trapp (41), Bieri (4), and Cravens (11), 
a description of a situation is followed by a number of 
possible alternative ways of behaving in the situation.
The prediotor is asked to state which choice a given person 
would make if placed in that situation.
Either of these methods might have been satisfactory 
for the present study. However, we settled on the latter 
method, primarily because we felt that having our subjects 
prediot the behavior of others in a relatively large num­
ber of "reality" situations would be much more representa­
tive of the individual’s day-to-day activities than would
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having him prediot responses to a personality inventory.
In other words, sinoe we were working from the assumption 
that in their normal activities individuals are constantly 
attempting to predict the behavior of those around them, we 
felt that the closer we could approximate these normal 
activities in our prediction test, the more valid our pro­
cedure was likely to be. We thus chose the prediction of 
behavior from verbal descriptions of ’’everyday" situations 
as our prediction test.
In choosing the specific prediction situations we had 
several criteria in mind. First, the situations should be 
realistic: they should be situations, involving a ohoioe of 
alternative behaviors, in which the persons to be predicted 
would have a reasonable chance of being found. We felt it 
would be unreasonable to ask a person to predict what 
behavior a college student would exhibit if he fell from 
his tricycle. In an attempt to maintain the realistic 
quality of our situations, as we developed them we con­
sulted with persons of the same sex and age and with simi­
lar experiences to those whom we expected to use as sub­
jects.
Secondly, we felt the two choices offered within the 
situation should be discriminative; a situation in which a 
subject predicted that all persons would choose the same 
alternative choice would be unsatisfactory for our
purposes. It was necessary to construct situations in 
which various persons would he seen as making different 
behavioral choices. Two methods were used to insure 
obtaining reasonably discriminative situations. First, be­
fore the experiment was run, the prediction test was given 
to five persons of similar age, sex, and experiences as the 
prospective subjects. Those situations in which these per­
sons consistently failed to discriminate in terms of their 
predictions were discarded. In addition, it was decided 
before the experiment was run that we would discard from 
the analysis any situation on which one-half or above of 
the subjects predicted everyone as making the same behav­
ioral choice. On this basis two out of an original twenty- 
six situations were discarded.
Our third criterion in choosing the prediction situa­
tions was that they should not be developed specifically to 
illustrate personality characteristics of people. It would 
be possible, for example, to develop a situation in which 
"honest" people would be discriminated from "dishonest" 
people. Developing our situations in this manner, however, 
would tend to "load" the test in favor of our hypothesis 
in that these characteristics are, in a sense, constructs 
and could thus be expected to show a relationship with the 
subject's constructs. We therefore developed the
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situations to represent various aspects of normal aotivity 
rather than to represent certain characteristics of the 
persons whom the subjeots were to predict.
Holding in consideration the above criteria we 
developed twenty-six situations representing various 
aspects of daily life likely to be enoountered by a female 
college student living in a dormitory or sorority house 
(see appendix B for a copy of the situations test). The 
description of eaoh situation was followed by two behav­
ioral choices which could be realistically made in that 
situation.
In responding to each prediction situation the sub­
jeot was asked to do three things: (1) State which of the
two behaviors offered she would choose, (2) prediot which 
choice eaoh of five other persons (the same persons whose 
names were included in the role title list of the RCRT) 
would state they would make, and (3) which choice each of 
the same five persons would make if they were actually in 
the situation.
The differentiation between predicting what the other 
persons will put down on paper or state what they would do 
(this will be referred to as Prediction I) and what they 
would actually do in the situation (Prediction II) was made 
to obtain some estimate of the degree to which consistent 
differences might arise when an experimenter instructs his
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subjeots to prediot how other persons will respond to a 
questionnaire and when he instructs them to predict what 
other persons will do in more "realistic" situations. 
Inasmuch as whether or not we prediot a person will do 
exactly what he tells us he will do involves such con­
structs as "insight,” "honesty," etc., we would expect our 
subjects' predictions on Prediction II to differ slightly 
from those on Prediction I. However, since they are both 
predictions and we have hypothesized prediction to be 
related to construction, we would not expect the correla­
tion between similarity of construction and similarity of 
prediction to differ significantly when similarity of pre­
diction is measured by Prediction I and Prediction II.
In our prediction situations, then, each subject pre­
dicted the behavioral choices that each of five other per­
sons would make in 24 situations. As with our measure of 
construction we could then determine how similarly the sub­
ject predicted these persons to behave when compared two 
at a time. Sinoe there were a total of 24 situations used 
in the final analysis it was possible to obtain from eaoh 
subject a similarity of prediction "score," ranging from 0 
to 24, for each comparison of ten pairs of persons (five 
persons, eaoh compared separately with the other four, 
yield ten comparisons). These prediction "scores" were 
obtained in relation to both Prediction I and Prediction IL
It is important for the reader to realize that the 
five persons ahout whom the predictions were made were the 
same persons upon whom the measures of similarity of con­
struction were taken. Thus for each person that the sub­
jects were construing and predicting we were able to obtain 
measures of how similarly he was oonstrued in relation to 
eaoh of four other persons and how similarly he was pre­
dicted to behave in relation to each of these same persons. 
Also, in regard to each subjeot, we were able to obtain 
three sets of 10 similarity of construction "scores” (simi­
larity of construction as measured by (1) checks, (2) 
voids, and (3) both together) and two sets of 10 similarity 
of prediction "scores” (Prediction I and Prediction II), 
This meant that for eaoh subjeot a total of six correla­
tions could be run between the measures of similarity of 
construction and similarity of prediction.
The Measurement of Validity
We have already mentioned that in responding to the 
prediction test eaoh subjeot first stated what she would do 
in the situations and then predicted what five other speci­
fied persons would do. Therefore, by dividing our subjects 
into sub-groups of six subjects eaoh and having them make 
their predictions about one another, we were able to utilize 
the self ohoioe statements of any one subject as valida­
tions! evidence for the predictions made about her by the
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other five. In this way we were able to obtain valida-
3In three of our sub-groups we were able to obtain 
only five subjeots. This meant that for the subjects of 
these groups we were able to obtain validational evidence 
for their predictions of four instead of five persons.
tional material for all of the predictions made by our 
subjeots.
Ideally, of course, in obtaining our validational evi­
dence we would have wished to observe the predlotees in 
various aotual situations, thus utilizing their behavior as 
our validity measure. Although not impossible, this would 
have proved highly uneconomical and would have also 
undoubtedly limited the number and kind of situations that 
oould be utilized. We therefore chose what we considered 
the next best alternative, that of having them state what 
they would do in the situations desoribed. We then asked 
our subjeots to predict both what the prediotee would state 
she would do (Prediotion I) and what she actually would do 
(Prediction II). Essentially, therefore, our validity 
information applies only to Prediction I. We were compar­
ing a subjeotfs predictions about what another person 
stated she would do in a given situation against what that 
person did state she would do in that situation. In 
measuring our subjects1 validity, however, we used the self 
ohoioe statements as a validity measure for both of the 
subjects* predictions. We did so with a realization that
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it applied more directly as a validity measure to Predic­
tion I than to Prediction II.
In relation to measuring the validity of interpersonal 
judgments or predictions, Hastorf and Bender (23) have 
raised the issue of what has been called "assimilative pro­
jection," following Cameron,s use of the term. They have 
maintained that there is a tendency for judges to prediot 
other persons as behaving similarly to themselves, and that 
any measurement of validity of predictions will therefore 
be spuriously high in oases where the judge and the subjeot 
(predictee) are, in fact, similar. They have, therefore, 
labeled any prediction in which the subject is predicted to 
behave similarly to how the judge behaves as a "projection" 
and have subtracted this from the judge's validity score. 
Operationally, they have based their validity scores only 
on those predictions in which the subjeot is predioted as 
behaving differently from the predictor.
Actually, Hastorf and Bender's designation of some 
predictions as "projections" appears to be based on the 
idea that predicting another person on the basis of assumed 
similarity to the self Involves no "insight" or knowledge 
about the individual. Any correspondence between the pre­
diction and the subject's behavior is thus considered as 
"accidental" and handled as experimental error. From our 
point of view, however, for one person to construe another
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as similar or dissimilar to the self is as meaningful as 
any other construction of that person. It may he an inade­
quate construction in that predictions based upon it are 
likely to be invalidated, but it can be considered as a 
method of construing others upon which predictions as to 
the others* behavior can be based. We would also maintain 
that this method of construing people is subject to the 
same effects of validation and invalidation of predictions 
as are other personal constructs. Therefore, we saw no 
reason for treating those predictions that Hastorf and 
Bender label as "projactions" any differently than the 
individual’s other predictions were treated.
Measurement of Comfort
Before the experiment proper was begun each subject 
was asked to fill out a general information sheet on which, 
among other things, she was asked to rank the other members 
of her sub-group in terms of how "comfortable1* she felt 
with each of them. These instructions were aocompanied 
with a short, prearranged talk by the experimenter on what 
was meant by feeling "comfortable*1 and "uncomfortable" in 
regard to another person (these instructions can be seen in 
appendix A). Basioally, the description was built around 
the notions of lack of threat and feeling of inhibition 
when interacting with the other person. Since our subjeots 
were to be drawn from relatively homogeneous groups we
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suspected that there would be relatively strong resistance 
to "spreading" the group members in terms of our comfort 
measure, especially to designating very many of them as 
causing the subject to feel uncomfortable. We therefore 
had them first rank the other sub-group members on this 
variable in order to attempt to force a certain amount of 
differentiation in regard to it.4
4 ' 1 ' ‘  - - r
We are indebted to Dr. Robert Wherry for the sug­
gestion that we utilize ranking as a method of inducing 
differentiation.
Following the ranking the subjects were asked to place 
each group member on a nine point "comfort scale" (this 
scale is reproduced in appendix B). A score of 1 was to be 
attributed by the subjeot to a person who "Makes me feel ilL 
at ease and uncomfortable” and a score of 9 to a person who 
"Makes me feel completely at ease and comfortable," Scores 
of 3, 5, and 7 were also aocompanied by verbal descrip­
tions, a score of 5, the midpoint in the scale, being des­
cribed as a person who "Doesnft make me feel unoomfortable, 
but I'm still not completely at ease with her."
The subjeots were instructed to place first on the 
scale the person whom they had ranked as the one with whom 
they felt most comfortable, next the person with whom they 
felt least comfortable or most uncomfortable, then the 
remaining three somewhere between these two. They were
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allowed to use equivalent ratings, but were instructed to 
do so only if it seemed entirely necessary. The point on 
the scale, estimated to the closest 1/2 point where the 
subject placed eaoh group member, was then taken as a meas­
ure of how comfortable she felt with that group member. 
Measurement of Actual Similarity
On eaoh of the 24 prediction situations, eaoh subjeot 
stated which behavior she would choose. By comparing the 
choices of one subjeot with those of another it was possi­
ble to determine how similar the two were in the behavioral 
choices. It is important to realize that this is not "per­
ceived” similarity, but similarity of behavior. It is a 
direct measure of the similarity of what two persons say 
about their behavior. To the degree that the persons would 
aotually behave as they say they would it is an inferred 
measure of their similarity in other than verbal behavior. 
We have termed this similarity in self-choices "actual 
similarity."
Since there were a total of 24 situations, it was 
possible for any subjects choices to be similar to any 
other subjectTs as few as 0 times and as many as 24. By 
using this measure it was possible to determine how 
similar, in terms of behavioral choices, each subject was 
to every other person in her sub-group.
Sub j eots
In several ways the particular measures which we 
wished to obtain limited us in the selection of subjeots. 
First, three factors demanded we choose our subjects from a 
relatively homogeneous group: (1) Since we wished to ob­
tain validity measures, all of the persons predioted would 
have to be available to us. It was thus decided to have 
the subjects predict one another, allowing us to get pre­
diction and validity data from the same subjects. (2)
Since the prediction test was relatively long and concerned 
predictions of specific behaviors, we felt that the sub­
jeots should know one another well enough to feel they 
could have some chance of predicting correotly in order to 
maintain their interest in the task. (3) Since the predic­
tion situations needed to be "realistic,n i.e., situations 
in which the predicted person might actually be found, the 
subjects must be similar enough for the situations to apply 
to all of them. Otherwise specific situations would have 
to be developed for eaoh subject or prediotee.
However, two factors argued against the use of a 
tightly homogeneous group. First, since we were using 
correlation techniques we must obtain adequate variance in 
our measures. If the subjects were too homogeneous in 
their interests and behavior there would probably be
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little variance in tiie degree to which they would construe 
and prediot one another, thus reducing the degree of meas­
ured correlation. Secondly, we wished to correlate our 
measure of validity with our measure of comfort. Here we 
needed an adequate amount of variance in the oomfort 
measure. In many groups we would find expressions of dis- 
oomfort in relation to other members depressed, thus reduc­
ing the variance of our comfort measure.
Our requirements, thus, were that we obtain subjects 
who knew one another well enough to feel they could predict 
each other’s behavior in a large number of situations, who 
were similar enough to allow our situations to apply to 
eaoh subject, who were dissimilar enough that there would 
likely be differentiation in the way they oonstrued and 
predicted one another, and who would show some differentia­
tion in the degree to which they felt comfortable and un­
comfortable with one another.
The subjeots used in the study consisted of 57 female 
college students, of whom 40 were selected from dormitory 
groups and 17 from a sorority group. The dormitory sub­
jeots were obtained by contacting their dormitory heads who 
then asked for volunteers, while the sorority subjects were 
obtained by contacting the sorority president who also 
asked for volunteers. As a whole, then, the subjects can 
be considered as cooperating on a voluntary basis.
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The mean age of the subjects was SO.9 years (S.D. 
1.41), and they had been in college an average of 5.S 
quarters (S.D. 3.49). The subjects had been acquainted 
with those about whom they made their predictions an aver­
age of 9.7 months (S.D. 7.S).
Procedure
The experimenter met with the subjects in three group 
sessions. The groups were composed of ss, 17 and 18 sub­
jects respectively. In each case the subject’s were asked 
to break themselves into smaller groups of 6 persons each 
(three of the sub-groups was composed of only five per­
sons). ilach sub-group of six students was then placed 
about a separate table and each subject at a table assigned 
a number from 1 to 6 which the other subjects at that, 
table were to use in referring to her. The only instruc­
tions given as to the composition of the sub-groups was 
that the subjeots should know one another well enough to 
feel they could make predictions about what each of them 
would do in a number of different situations.
In an introduction to the experiment, which was read 
by the experimenter (a copy of this introduction and all 
instructions is reproduced in appendix A), it was pointed 
out that psychologists were interested in two problems:
(1) How people of the subjects’ age group tend to concep­
tualize or classify other people, and (2) how well they can
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predict other people* These were introduced as two separ­
ate problems since we did not wish the subjeots to attempt 
consciously to relate their construction of their group 
members with their predictions of them. From discussions 
with the subjects following the experiment it appeared that 
we were successful in this respeot.
Following the introduction, the subjeots were 
instructed to fill out a General Information Sheet con­
taining personal data, their ranking of the other members 
in their sub-group in terms of how well they felt they knew 
eaoh, and their ranking of how comfortable they felt with 
eaoh of their sub-group members. The Comfort Scale (dis­
cussed fully on page 84) was also included on this sheet.
When all of the subjeots had completed the General 
Information Sheet, the grid form of the RCRT (see appendix
B) was administered to the total group. The instructions 
were read by the experimenter and individual help was given 
to those who needed it. In filling out the role title list 
the subjects were instructed to insert the first names of 
the other members of their sub-group into the appropriately 
numbered spaces on the list. In this manner the other mem­
bers of the sub-group were incorporated into eaoh subject’s 
RCRT. As eaoh subject completed the RCRT she was allowed 
to begin the predictions test. Since the instructions were 
printed on the test blank (see appendix B), they were not
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read by the experimenter. However, the experimenter 
ohecked with eaoh subjeot after she had read the instruc­
tions and before she began the test items to assure that 
she understood the instructions.
Unusable Protocols
The protocols of two subjeots were discarded from the 
study. One of these was dropped beoause the subjeot had 
obviously misunderstood the directions to the predictions 
test. The other subjeot was forced to leave during the 
experiment and was unable to complete the predictions test. 
Summary
Fifty-seven subjeots were broken down into sub-groups 
of six subjeots eaoh. Eaoh subject then filled out a 
General Information Sheet. Following this the grid form of 
the RCRT, in whioh the other members of each subjeot*s sub­
group were incorporated as role figures, was administered* 
Eaoh subjeot then responded to a prediction "test” in which 
she made predictions as to how 5 other persons would behave 
in each of 24 verbally described situations. The complete 
experimental procedure lasted approximately two and one- 
half hours.
CHAPTER V
RESULTS
The First Hypothesis
Our first hypothesis stated that when persons are 
oonstrued as similar they will be predioted as behaving 
similarly in given ohoioe situations. Our interest, then, 
was in testing the degree of relationship between how 
similar to one another certain persons were oonstrued by 
our subjects and how similarly they were predioted to 
behave.
The reader will remember that eaoh subjeot oonstrued 
and made predictions about the five other persons in her 
sub-group. This meant that we could determine how simi­
larly eaoh of ten pairs of persons was oonstrued by each 
subjeot and how similarly eaoh of the same ten pairs was 
predicted to behave. Eaoh pair could be oonstrued as 
similar from 0 to 22 times and predioted as behaving 
similarly 0 to 24 times. The means and S.D.'s for simi­
larity of construction and similarity of prediction are 
presented in Table 1. These means represent the average 
similarity of oonstruotion and prediction drawn between 
persons when taken in pairs.
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TABLE 1
AVERAGE MEAN AND S.D. OF SIMILARITY OF CONSTRUCTION 
AND SIMILARITY OF PREDICTION 
N«57
CONSTRUCTION PREDICTION I PREDICTION II 
M 14.7 16.7 14.9
STd T 2.76 2.46 2.89
In testing the relationship between similarity of con­
struction and similarity of prediction a Pearson r based 
upon ten pairs of observations was run between similarity 
of construction and similarity of prediction for each 
individual (the individual r*s are reproduced in appendix
C). The z transformation (of. MoNemar (35), p. 123 for 
this method) was then applied to eaoh individual r, and the 
z scores were averaged. This average z and its correspond­
ing average r were then tested for the significance of the 
difference from a zero correlation. The same analysis was 
made for both Prediction I and Prediction II. Similarity 
of construction was measured by utilizing correspondence of 
both cheoks and voids. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 2. The results indicate than when an
TABLE 2
AVERAGE Z AND R BETWEEN SIMILARITY OF CONSTRUCTION 
AND SIMILARITY OF PREDICTION 
Nr 5 7
-5_ JEl
Prediction I .286 .28 .04
Prediction II .267 .26 .05
*As measured by a two-tailed test.
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individual construes persons as similar, as measured by 
performance on the RCRT, there is a definite tendency for 
him to prediot them as behaving similarly in given choice 
situations. The first hypothesis is thus substantiated at 
an acceptable level of confidence.
It is also interesting to note, in view of our earlier 
statements concerning the difference between Prediction I 
and Prediction II, that although there is a definite 
tendency for the subjeots to prediot one another as behav­
ing more similarly in terms of Prediction I than in terms 
of Prediction II (p» .001), there is no significant differ­
ence between the correlation of similarity of construction 
and similarity of prediction when Prediction I and Predic­
tion II are used as a measure of similarity of prediction. 
Thus our statements (cf. p. 80) that we would expect the 
predictions to differ somewhat when we compared Prediction 
I and Prediction II but that we would not expect the corre­
lation of these two measures with similarity of construc­
tion to differ significantly would also seem to be veri­
fied.
The fact that the subjects tended to predict one 
another as behaving more similarly in terms of Prediction I 
than in terms of Prediction II would appear to be an inter­
esting finding. They seem to be predicting one another as 
behaving more similarly on a verbal level than on other
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levels of behavior. While they might predict two or more 
persons as stating they would make the same choice, they 
predict them as differing from one another in their behav­
ior in the actual situation. Of course it should be men­
tioned that although the difference is highly significant 
in a statistical sense the actual mean difference (1.8) is 
relatively small.
The Second Hypothesis
Our seoond hypothesis stated that the behavior in cer­
tain choice situations of those persons with whom an indi­
vidual feels "comfortable” will be predicted more validly 
than the behavior of those with whom he feels "uncomfort­
able.” In testing this hypothesis we were interested in 
measuring the relationship between an individuals state­
ments as to how "comfortable” he felt with certain other 
persons and how validly he was able to predict the behavior 
of these same persons.
On the basis of how the subject placed the other mem­
bers of his sub-group on the "comfort scale," completed 
during the collection of the general information, it was 
possible to obtain a score which would serve as an estimate 
of how oomfortable each subject felt with each other member 
of his sub-group. This score oould range from 1 to 9. It 
was then possible to compare the score assigned by a sub­
ject to each sub-group member with the number of valid
96
predictions made about each member by the subject. Since 
the subject made 24 predictions, her validity "score" in 
relation to each person could range from 0 to 24. In 
Table 3 are presented the mean comfort and validity scores 
and their respective S.D.»s. Again the reader should note 
that a mean score and a S.D. was obtained for each subjeot 
in relation to both of these measures and that the figures 
presented in Table 3 represent the average of these indi­
vidual means and S.D.’s. Validity of both Prediction I 
and Prediction II was obtained.
TABLE 3
AVERAGE MEAN AND S.D. OF "COMFORT"
AND VALIDITY SCORES 
N-57
COMFORT VALIDITY I VALIDITY H
M 7.3 14.5 14.1
sTd T 2.31 2.00 2.22
To test the degree of relationship between comfort, as 
measured by our comfort score, and validity of predictions, 
a Pearson r was run between these two measures for each x 
subjeot. For the 7 sub-groups in which there were six sub­
jects, the individual correlations were based on 5 pairs 
of observations. For the three sub-groups In which there 
were only 5 subjects, the individual correlations were 
based on 4 pairs of observations. These intra-individual 
correlations were then transformed to z scores, as was done
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in testing the first hypothesis, and averaged. A test was 
then made of the significance of the average z soore and 
its corresponding average r from a zero correlation. As 
shown in Table 4, the results of this analysis are sup­
portive of the hypothesis, especially in regard to Pre­
diction II. It would appear that there does exist a
TABLE 4
AVERAGE Z AND r BETWEEN COMFORT SCORE AND VALIDITY 
OF PREDICTION FOR PREDICTION I AND PREDICTION II
Ns57
Z r -El
Prediction I .255 .25 .06
Prediction II .443 • 42 .001
*As measured by a two-tailed test.
demonstrable relationship between the degree of "comfort," 
as we have measured it, one individual feels in relation 
to another and the number of valid predictions he can make 
about that person.
The Third Hypothesis
In the third hypothesis we were concerned with the 
interpretation which could be placed on the relative mean­
ing of checks and voids in the grid form of the RCRT. We 
reasoned that if the two measures were equally meaningful 
or were measures of the same psychological process, a meas­
ure of similarity of construction based on each one should
correlate equally with a single outside variable such as 
our measure of similarity of prediction. In Table 3 are 
presented the means and S.D^s of these two measures of 
similarity of construction. A measure of mean similarity 
of oonstruotion and the S.D. of this mean was obtained for 
each subjeot. The figures presented in Table 5 are the 
averages of these intra-individual measures.
TABLE 5
MEAN SIMILARITY OF CONSTRUCTION AS MEASURED BY 
CHECKS AND AS MEASURED BY VOIDS 
N=57
CHECKS VOIDS
M 5.2 9.4
s7d7 2.13 2.31
A t test run between the S.D.’s of mean similarity as 
measured by oheoks and voids indicated that these two meas­
ures did not differ significantly in this respeot. Thus, 
any differences in the correlation of both of these meas­
ures with a single outside variable could not be explained 
on the basis of different variances.
As in testing our first hypothesis, each of the meas­
ures of similarity of construction was correlated with the 
two measures of similarity of prediction. An r between 
these measures was obtained for each subjeot. These indi­
vidual r*s were then transformed to a z score and these 
scores were averaged. Table 6 presents the results of
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this analysis
TABLE 6
AVERAGE r»S BETWEEN SIMILARITY OE CONSTRUCTION 
AS MEASURED BY CHECKS ALONE AND VOIDS ALONE, 
AND SIMILARITY OE PREDICTION 
N=57
CHECKS VOIDS DIEEERENOE
Prediction I 27 14
p = .04 p=.30 P = .17
Prediction II 29 10
p r .03 pr*4Q P = .01
The results of this analysis are somewhat equivooable, 
hut in general they suggest that the hypothesis of equality 
of meaning of oheoks and voids is not substantiated. The 
null hypothesis is definitely rejected in relation to Pre­
diction II (p=.01) and there is a trend toward its rejec­
tion in regard to Prediction I (pr.17).
Sinoe our hypothesis was concerned only with the rela­
tive meaning of checks and voids our data offer nothing in 
respect to the "actual" meaning of these two measures.
About all we can say upon examination of our data is that 
the two do not appear to be measures of the same prooesses. 
However, it is interesting to note that in relation to both 
Prediction I and Prediction II the correlation between 
similarity of construction and prediction is highest when 
similarity of construction is measured in tenas of
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correspondence of checks alone* If we assume that our 
measure of similarity of prediction is a valid measure of 
how similarly people are seen, the low correlations between 
this measure of similarity and similarity of construction 
as measured by voids would suggest that the use of voids 
alone to measure the similarity with which persons are seen 
by the subject is a questionable procedure* We will have 
more to say about this in a more complete discussion of our 
results in the following chapter.
The Fourth Hypothesis
In our fourth hypothesis we stated that when persons 
are asked to predict the behavior of others, they will pre­
dict most validly those individuals whom they most resemble 
in their behavioral choices. Here, we were interested in 
the relationship between how validly one person could pre- 
diot the behavior of another person and how similar he was 
to the other person in terms of his behavioral choices*
In Table 7 are presented the mean number of valid
TABLE 7
MEAN NUMBER OF VALID PREDICTIONS MADE BY THE SUBJECTS 
AND THE MEAN SIMILARITY OF BEHAVIORAL CHOICES 
BETWEEN THE SUBJECTS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE 
SUB-GROUP MEMBERS 
Ns57
VALIDITY VALIDITY SIMILARITY
PREDICTION I PREDICTION II OF CHOICE
M 14.5 14.1 14.2
STd T 2.00 2.22 1.90
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predictions made by the subjects and the mean number of 
times the subjects1 statements of whioh behavior they would 
choose in the 24 situations agreed with the self-choices of 
the other members of their respective sub-groups.
In testing the degree of relationship between validity 
of predictions and amount of similarity, a Pearson r was 
run between these two measures for each individual. Both 
measures could range from scores of 0 to 24. As in dealing 
with our other hypotheses, the correlation between these 
two measures for each individual was obtained. These indi­
vidual rrs were then transformed to z scores and averaged. 
The results of this analysis, as presented in Table 8, 
indioate that the null hypothesis can be rejected with a 
reasonable degree of certainty.
TABLE 8
AVERAGE z AND r BETWEEN VALIDITY OP 
PREDICTION AND ACTUAL SIMILARITY
N-57
z r _ eJL
PREDICTION I • 255 .25 .06
PREDICTION II .267 .26 .05
*As measured by a two-tailed test.
It should be pointed out that it is in relation to our 
fourth hypothesis that those utilizing the concept of 
assimilative projective would raise the most clamorous 
objections. They would undoubtedly argue that the
io a
relationship we have demonstrated could be at least partly 
explained on the basis of the tendency to project and the 
"accidental” similarity existing among the subjects. How­
ever, holding our point of view that what is known as 
assimilative projection must be based on the way in which 
the individual to be predicted is construed, we would main­
tain that the validity of the prediction is a meaningful 
rather than accidental measure.
Validity and Length of Acquaintance
Although we did not state it as a formal hypothesis we 
believed that we might expect to find a positive relation­
ship between the validity of our subjects* predictions and 
the length of time they had known one another. We there­
fore ran a Pearson r between the length of acquaintance and 
Prediction I. The means, S.D.’s, and the correlation 
between these two measures are presented in Table 9* The
TABLE 9
PEARSON r BETWEEN LENGTH OF ACQUAINTANCE IN 
MONTHS AND VALIDITY OF PREDICTION I
N-57
LENGTH OF ACQUAINTANCE VALIDITY OF PREDICTION I 
(IN MONTHS)______  ________________________
9.7 14.5
7.S 2.00
.18
M
S.D.
r
103
oorrelation of ,18 is not statistically significant 
(p-.17), and thus we oannot assume a relationship between 
these two variables. Although this appears somewhat 
mystifying, a similar finding was reported by Trapp (47). 
Working on a similar problem in reference to his subjects 
Trapp compared the errors of predictions made by his sub­
jects who had been in the group more than 2 years and those 
who had been in the group less than two years. He found no 
significant difference between these two groups and oon- 
oluded: "It suggests that somewhere within the first year
of acquaintance the subjects have stabilized the conceptual 
pictures of each other, and events taking place beyond this 
stage have had little effect in changing the over-all 
developed picture." (41, p. 124)
A further factor seems important in relation to our 
own sample, however. Since in obtaining our correlation we 
computed a Pearson r for eaoh individual, we were able to 
note that many of our subjects had been acquainted with 
eaoh of the other sub-group members for the same length of 
time, thus making the correlation in their cases zero. In 
all, this was true in 25 of our 57 subjects. There thus 
seem to be such large individual differences in the vari­
ance in regard to this measure that the procedure of aver­
aging them to obtain an average oorrelation is question­
able. We therefore feel that our sample does not provide
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us with an adequate measure of the relationship between 
length of acquaintance and validity of prediction.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In review, the present study was designed to test the 
hypotheses that (1) when persons are construed by an 
individual as similar they will be predicted to behave 
similarly, (2) the behavior of persons with whom an indi­
vidual feels "comfortable” will be predicted more validly 
than the behavior of those with whom he feels "uncomfort­
able," (3) there will be no difference between the oorre­
lation of similarity of construction and similarity of 
prediction when similarity of construction is measured by 
correspondence of RCRT grid oheoks and when it is measured 
by RCRT grid voids, and (4) persons will predict most 
validly the behavior of those individuals whom they most 
resemble in their behavioral ohoioes*
Constructs and Predictions
In relation to our first hypothesis we obtained six 
different, although not independent, measures of the rela­
tionship between similarity of construction and similarity 
of prediction* This was possible sinoe we obtained three 
measures of similarity of construction (oheoks and voids 
taken together, checks alone, and voids alone) and two
measures of similarity of prediction (predictions of what
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an individual will say he will do in a given situation and 
predictions of what the individual would actually do in the 
situation). The results of these measures were presented 
in Table 2, page 93 and in Table 6, page 99. From these 
tables it can be seen that our results are largely sup­
portive of our first hypothesis. There does indeed seem to 
exist a relationship between an individuals construing 
persons as similar and predicting them to behave similarly. 
However, this relationship does not seem to hold up when 
voids are used in the measurement of similarity of con­
struction. Our third hypothesis, therefore, is not sup­
ported. It does appear that when voids alone are used in 
measuring similarity of construction there is a significant 
difference in the correlation of this measure with simi­
larity of prediction from when cheoks alone are used in 
measuring similarity of construction. In addition, the 
oorrelation of similarity of prediction is consistently 
lower when similarity of construction is measured by 
correspondence of voids. Why should this occur?
In examining the RCRT protocols we found that such 
constructs as "Have similar goals in life— Different 
goals," "Brothers— Not brothers," "Related— Not related" 
oocurred with reasonable frequency. As a rule these con­
structs are used impermeably in that they cannot be used to 
describe persons other than those on whom they have been
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formed. For example, having once designated two persons as 
being similar in that they are brothers limits considerably 
the number of persons who can be checked as similar to 
these two. However, what does a oell left blank in this 
case mean? That all other persons are similar in that they 
are not brothers to the first two? Now whether we refer to 
this as a breakdown in conceptualization of the individual 
or as a failure of the test to elicit operant constructs, 
or constructs used in prediction, it is^jjhvious that by 
designating 20 persons as being similar on the basis that 
they are not brothers, the individual is not likely to pre­
dict that these 20 persons will behave similarly in a given 
situation. On such constructs we would therefore not 
expect to find a relationship between similarity of con­
struction as measured by voids alone and similarity of pre­
diction. We believe that the elicitation of such constructs 
as this on the RCRT accounts for the difference which we 
have found between checks and voids.
On the basis of our results we feel that those util­
izing the counting of correspondence of checks and voids in 
interpreting the RCRT should proceed with caution if they 
are interpreting correspondence of voids to mean that 
similarity is implied. If we assume for the moment that an 
individual^ predicting two persons as behaving similar 
means that he has viewed them or oonstrued them as similar, 
then our results would strongly suggest that the
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utilization of correspondence of voids to measure similar­
ity of construction is a questionable procedure. We would 
therefore oonolude that some reinterpretation of the mean­
ing and use of voids on the RCRT grid form is neoessary.
Some question should arise in relation to our first 
hypothesis as to why the correlations, although statis­
tically significant, are consistently low. If the reader 
will remember, in order to meet the specifications of our 
design we were forced to draw our subjects from a rela­
tively homogeneous population in regard to age, sex, and 
experiential background. This meant, since they were con­
struing and predicting one another, that our subjects were 
construing and predicting persons who were quite similar to 
one another. We were thus likely to find that the mean 
similarity of both construction and prediction would be 
high and that the mean range of similarity "scores” for 
both would be low. These measures are presented in Table 
10.
When we consider that similarity of construction 
scores could range from 0 to 22 and similarity of predic­
tion scores from 0 to 24, our obtained mean ranges appear 
quite constricted. It is to this constriction of the 
ranges of both of our variables that we would attribute 
much of the tendency for our correlation coefficients to be 
consistently low* This, of course, would argue that in
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TABLE 10
MEAN SIMILARITY SCORES AND MEAN RANGES 
EOR SIMILARITY OF CONSTRUCTION AND 
SIMILARITY OF PREDICTION 
N=57
MEAN SIMILARITY SCORE MEAN RANGE OF
______________________ SIMILARITY SCORES
Construction 14,7 8,2
Prediction I 16.7 7,8
Prediction II 14,9 8.6
future tests of this and similar hypotheses the subjects 
should be allowed to predict and construe individuals form­
ing a more heterogeneous population.
A further point to be considered in relation to our 
low correlations arises in regard to the adequacy of the 
RCRT as a method of obtaining measures of similarity of 
construction. Among those working with this test there has 
long been a belief that not all constructs are verbalized 
and that not all of the individual's operant constructs, or 
those dominant in shaping the individuals anticipations, 
are elicited in any given administration of the test. We 
would, therefore, not expect a perfect oorrelation between 
our measures of similarity of construction and similarity 
of prediction. In other words, it is possible that certain 
of the subjects* predictions were based partly, at least, 
upon constructs which did not appear on the RCRT, and the 
similarity between construction and prediction was thus not
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apparent in these oases* Past research, however, has 
shown many positive results based on the assumption that 
the RCRT provides a sample of the personal oonstruot sys­
tem adequate for making predictions of the nature we have 
made in the present study. The studies of Pooh (36),
Bieri (4), and Levy (32) are evidenoe to this fact. Thus 
we have assumed that although we do not have a perfect or 
complete measure of the individual's personal oonstruot 
system and would therefore not expect a perfect or extreme­
ly high correlation between our two variables, we do have 
reason to believe that we have an adequate measure of the 
system on which to base our present predictions.
In this sense our relatively low correlations, 
although not desirable, are not catastrophic. They do, 
however, point out a need for further research including 
refined approaches to the measurement of personal oon- 
struots and the relation between constructs and predic­
tion, On the basis of personal oonstruot theory we would 
predict a strong relationship between these two prooesses. 
We did not obtain this in our study, but we believe the 
cause lies in limitations of the design and instruments 
used rather than in a fallacy of the prediction made. We 
would suggest that a further research step be the study of 
the possible depressing effect upon the measured oorrela­
tion which we have hypothesized to result from the
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restricted ranges in both oar measures. Following this, 
should the correlations remain relatively low, we would 
suggest that attention and research efforts should be 
turned to the development of refinements in the RCRT 
itself. The results in relation to our third hypothesis 
suggest a possible direction in which these efforts should 
move.
Comfort and Yalidity
Several things need to be said in relation to our 
results concerning our hypothesis that an individual would 
report feelings of comfort in regard to those whom he pre­
dicted validly and feelings of discomfort in regard to 
those whom he predicted invalidly. First it must be noted 
that our subjects received no invalidating evidence during 
the experimental procedure. In making our test of the 
relationship we have assumed that our subjeots have inter­
acted in the past with the persons whom they were predic­
ting and that if they made invalid predictions on the 
situations test they had also been making invalid predic­
tions during these past interactions. We were forced to 
make this assumption on the basis that if the individual 
has had no opportunity to interact or obtain information 
about a person he can have no opportunity to oonstrue 
whatever predictions he has made about that person as 
valid or invalid. It will be remembered that in our
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discussion relating to this hypothesis we stated that we 
would expect to find such a relationship only in the oases 
where the individual construed his predictions as invali­
dated, so the method we have used to test our hypothesis 
concerning validity and comfort makes the assumption that 
if the individual makes invalid predictions concerning a 
certain individual on our predictions test he has also made 
invalid predictions about that individual in past inter­
action with him.
Since we have no measure of the relationship between 
our test of a person*s ability to make valid predictions 
about another person and his ability to do so in other 
situations, we have no way of knowing whether or not our 
assumption that invalid predictions on the test reflect 
invalid predictions in past interactions has been substan­
tiated by the results. However, by developing the test as 
closely as possible around everyday situations likely to 
have been encountered by our subjeots we hoped to make the 
transfer from the actual situation to the test as plausible 
as possible. The oomments of our subjeots would suggest 
that we were relatively successful in this attempt*
A further limitation in regard to this finding 
revolves around the "Comfort Soale." In administering the 
ranking and rating tests of amount of comfort we found our 
subjects quite hesitant in distributing the other sub­
group members on the scale. They seemed to have
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considerable difficulty in differentiating among their sub­
group members in relation to how comfortable they felt with 
them. This leads us to approach the scaling results cau­
tiously. It also argues that in future tests of this rela­
tionship the subjects should be selected so as to exhibit 
more heterogeneity in relation to feelings of comfort in 
regard to those whom they are predicting. The fact that we 
obtained a mean oomfort score of 7.2 on a scale running 
from 1 to 9 suggests that our subjeots evidenced a strong 
tendency to group the other members at the upper limits of 
the scale.
We thus look upon our results in regard to this 
hypothesis as quite tentative. However, we feel that the 
results obtained provide strong justification for further 
study of this problem. The relationship between validity 
of interpersonal predictions and such faotors as anxiety 
and threat are quite basic for the psychology of personal 
constructs since this is one of the major areas in whioh 
this theoretical approaoh differs from the more traditional 
approaches. The more traditional theories would predict 
that feelings of discomfort would be voiced in relation to 
persons from whom the individual has received some kind of 
unpleasant stimulus or from whom he expects to receive some 
kind of punishment. From personal oonstruot theory, how­
ever, we would argue from the point of view of difficulties
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in the individual1s anticipation-validation sequence. The 
individual beoomes disturbed in relation to an object not 
so much beoause he has been or expects to be injured by 
that object but because he has difficulty in construing 
and predicting its behavior. The same, of course, would 
hold in relation to another person. Invalidation of pre­
dictions constitutes the cue that the individual is not 
construing an object or person adequately, and the feel­
ings which we have here labeled discomfort are the result.
In regard to this hypothesis, some persons might argue 
that the individual could be expected both to feel more 
comfortable with and to predict most validly those persons 
with whom he has had the most interpersonal contact. 
Although we have no direct evidenoe concerning this, our 
results in regard to the lack of relationship between 
validity and length of acquaintance, when coupled with 
Trapp*s (41) similar finding, argue against such an inter­
pretation. This point, however, is amenable to experimen­
tation and thus suggests a possible experimental extension 
of our hypothesis.
The area which we have touched upon in this hypothesis 
is thus an important area for the psychology of personal 
constructs. Our results in regard to this hypothesis, 
although tentative, provide some support for the validity 
of this theoretioal view of the relation between certain
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feelings and validity of interpersonal predictions. They 
thus argue strongly for further research.
Validity and Actual Similarity
In introducing our hypothesis regarding the relation­
ship between validity of predictions and behavioral simi­
larity we reasoned that we would expect to find such a 
relationship on the basis of the individualfs construing 
others as similar or dissimilar to himself and utilizing 
this construct as a basis for prediction. We were particu­
larly interested in studying this factor as one of those 
entering into the making of valid predictions inasmuch as 
it is consistent with the viewpoint expressed in this study 
and inasmuch as most of the other studies dealing with the 
problem have been oonoemed with variables which we would 
oall "external” suoh as age, sex, training, adjustment, 
etc., rather than upon the particular ways in which the 
judge conceptualizes or construes the subjeot and the 
interaction which has taken place between the subjeot and 
judge.
The writer would argue that if we are oonoerned with 
the problem of studying possible factors whioh determine 
the validity of interpersonal predictions we might more 
profitably look to the particular constructs that the judge 
is utilizing in making his predictions than to our particu­
lar ways of construing the judge. It will be remembered
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that from his results Trapp (41) concluded that individuals 
oould he viewed as possessing patterned predictive systems 
which varied in their efficiency. In relation to our 
hypothesis we are arguing that the particular or personal 
ways in which one individual construes another are deter­
minants of his ability to predict the behavior of the 
other. The fact that we obtained positive results in rela­
tion to our hypothesis adds support to our point of view.
In any discussion of this hypothesis it must be 
pointed out that there are other possible interpretations 
of the results which we have obtained. We have already 
pointed out that those utilizing the concept of projective 
assimilation would argue that we would expect to find 
validity related to actual similarity whenever we find the 
judges "projecting” or predicting that the subjects would 
behave the same as they would. The faot that in 69 per 
cent of their predictions our "judges" predicted that the 
subjects of their predictions would make the same behav­
ioral choice as they, would only add to their objections 
in regard to our interpretation. However, it must be 
remembered that our whole point of view holds that an 
individual’s predictions are based upon his constructions 
of events. The questioning of whether a prediction whioh 
is operationally valid in terms of our measuring techniques 
is "really" valid or is accidently valid as a result of the
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interaction of projection and actual similarity seems some­
what useless to us* If we see the individual as behaving 
in terms of his anticipations, the question of whether a 
given anticipation is a "projection" or not is of little 
oonsequenoe. We feel that our conceptualization of the 
problem has the advantage in that by viewing the construct 
of perceived similarity— dissimilarity as merely one more 
personal oonstruot we are able to relate it to our general 
theoretical position and are therefore not forced to 
develop any special "rules" to apply to this situation. We 
would agree that many individuals tend to oonstrue and thus 
predict others as behaving similarly to themselves, that 
there are individual differences in the degree to which 
they do so, and that invalid predictions often result from 
this procedure. We believe, however, that this process is 
not of a different kind than any other oonstruction- 
anticipation-validation sequence, so we see no reason for 
treating it differently.
Implications of the Research
At the outset we viewed our study primarily as a 
"definitive" rather than "elaborative" research. In this 
we meant that we perceived the study as throwing some 
light on the constructs and relationships already developed 
within the theory rather than as a development and testing 
of new constructs or relationships. Therefore, the major
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weight of our implications must relate to the theory from 
which we started. In this light we can say that our 
results have been largely supportive of personal construct 
theory as an approach to personality study. This is 
especially true when we consider that our first hypothesis 
dealt with one of the major assumptions of the theory. A 
theory of personality is constructed, of course, in the 
hope that in utilizing it one will he able to make predic­
tions about individual behavior* In utilizing a theory to 
prediot one moves from observations of the individual— to 
interpretations or abstractions of these observations in 
terms of the theory's oonstruots— to predictions of behav­
ior. In personal oonstruot theory the movement is from 
observation of behavior— to inferences regarding personal 
oonstruots and anticipations on the basis of the personal 
oonstruot system— to predictions of behavior. In order to 
proceed in this manner the assumption is made that an 
individual's anticipations, and thus his behavior, depend 
upon his personal way of oonstruing events. The support 
offered our first hypothesis is also support for the 
reasonableness of the assumption that personal oonstruots 
and anticipations are related. Research can now proceed 
on surer footing to explore the relationships between 
anticipations and resulting behavior, with the ultimate 
hope that by obtaining measures in regard to the personal
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oonstruot system we can move easily to predictions of 
behavior.
In addition, the relationship we found between 
validity of predictions and statements as to feelings of 
comfort in regard to those about whom the predictions are 
made suggests that an anticipatory view of man may be a 
useful alternative to the view that man is seeking rewards 
and moving away from punishments. Here, we have viewed 
such feelings as anxiety, threat, interpersonal oomfort and 
disoomfort as related to validity of prediction rather than 
past unpleasant experiences or expectancy of punishment and 
have received some support for our point of view. Gur 
study does not indicate whether or not this is a more com­
prehensive point of view than the traditional approach.
Our purpose was only to gain some experimental evidence 
which might help us determine if this is a tenable assump­
tion, Our results suggest that it is tenable; further 
research will be needed to examine its comprehensiveness 
and usefulness.
Since our study is derived explicitly from personal 
construct theory the implications which it has for psy­
chology as a whole are largely the implications of the 
theory itself and as such are to be found in Kelly's (29) 
development of the theory. Rather than viewing the indi­
vidual as behaving on the basis of relationships built up
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between certain stimuli or stimulus configurations and his 
behavior, personal construct theory argues that we might 
better view the individuals behavior as the result of the 
ways in which he construes his environment and the antici­
pations which he develops on the basis of these personal 
constructs. The emphasis is thus not upon the particular 
experiences to which an individual has been subjected but 
the ways in which he has construed these experiences. Pre­
dictions are made largely on the basis of the constructs 
and attempts to anticipate rather than on the basis of the 
experiences themselves.
Furthermore, on the basis of personal construct 
theory, psychotherapy is designed to produoe changes in 
behavior by setting up conditions in which changes occur in 
the personal construct system and the resulting anticipa­
tions rather than by such things as producing "catharsis," 
"insight,” "reduction of anxiety,” the establishment of 
new "reinforcements,” the "extinction" of certain behaviors, 
or other such procedures. It is assumed that behavior can 
best be viewed as the result of constructs and anticipa­
tions and that to produce changes in behavior we mu3t pro­
duoe changes in the oonstruot-anticipation-validation 
sequence. On this basis the therapist views his patient in 
the therapy situation as developing anticipations, forming 
constructs, and receiving validation and invalidation. He
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also views himself as a possible validator and invalidator 
of the patient’s particular anticipations. He realizes 
that the particular validational or invalidational evidence 
which he, in his own behavior, presents may lead to changes 
in the patient’s behavior and to such phenomena as anxiety, 
threat, satisfaction, etc. The therapist’s interest, 
therefore, is not so much in the patient's past experiences 
or his ’’insight” in regard to these, but in what predic­
tions the patient is making both in an out of the therapy 
room and the features of the construct system which lead 
the patient to these predictions. The emphasis, thus, is 
upon the patient as an active interpreter, anticipator, 
and manipulator of his environment, not upon the patient 
as an organism determined to behave in certain ways as the 
result of being faced with certain stimuli.
Summary
In general, our results have been supportive of the 
hypotheses which we have developed. To the extent that 
these hypotheses can be seen as clearly related to the 
theoretical structure from which we developed them, that 
structure itself has received support. As we stated at the 
outset we did not expect our results, no matter what the 
outcome, to "make or break" the theory. However, we do 
feel that they have thrown some light on the amount of
128
confidence which can be placed on the theory’s 
and assumed relationships. We see in this the 
tribution of the present research.
constructs 
major con-
CHAPTER VTI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study was derived from a particular theory of 
human personality, The Psychology of Personal Constructs 
(29), and was undertaken as an attempt to throw some 
light on the acceptability of the theory*s major constructs 
and the relationships assumed to exist among those con­
structs.
Specifically, the hypotheses of the study dealt with 
three major areas of personal construct theory: (1) The
relationship between personal constructs and interpersonal 
predictions, (2) the measurement of personal constructs, 
and (3) the validity of interpersonal predictions. In 
testing the hypotheses, both a modified grid form of the 
Role Construct Repertory Test (see 29, Chap. 10 for a com­
plete description of this test) and a situations prediction 
test were administered to a group of 57 female, undergradu­
ate college students at The Ohio State University. The 
Role Construct Repertory Test (RCRT) is a concept-formation 
test utilizing the oommon method of sorting to establish 
the presence of the concepts, with the exception that 
people familiar to the testee are sorted rather than 
objeots. In completing the test the testee considers
124
certain persons who have played important roles in his life 
three at a time, stating in each case the important way in 
which two of the persons are alike and at the same time 
different from the third person* Twenty-two such triad 
sorts are oompleted, giving the experimenter a measure of 
the individuals methods of construing important persons 
within his experience.
The situations prediction test used in the study con­
sisted of 24 verbally desoribed behavioral choice situa­
tions in which the subjeot was instructed to state which of 
two alternative behaviors offered in regard to each situa­
tion she would most likely exhibit and to predict which of 
the two^ alternatives each of five other given persons would 
most likely exhibit. These same five persons were 
included as figures in the Role Construct Repertory Test,
It was thus possible to obtain measures as to how the sub­
ject both construed and predicted these same persons. In 
addition, by obtaining the responses of the five predicted 
persons to the same situations prediction test it was poss­
ible to obtain validity measures for each subject’s pre­
dictions ,
The first hypothesis of the study stated that when 
persons are construed by an individual as being similar 
they will be predioted as behaving similarly in given 
choice situations. This hypothesis was derived from the
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assumption, within personal construct theory, that an indi­
vidual’s anticipations or predictions concerning events 
within his environment depend upon the ways in which he 
construes those events. The results of the study sup­
ported this hypothesis at an acceptable level of statis­
tical significance.
The second hypothesis of the study stated that the 
behavior in certain choice situations of those persons with 
whom an individual feels "oomfortable" will be predicted 
more validly than the behavior of those with whom he feels 
"uncomfortable." This hypothesis was derived from the 
position, within personal construct theory, that such pro­
cesses as fear, anxiety, and threat are related to the 
reception, by the individual, of invalidating evidence for 
his personal predictions. The results of the study were 
in support of this hypothesis.
The third hypothesis stated that there will be no 
difference between the correlation of similarity of con­
struction and similarity of prediction when similarity of 
construction is measured by correspondence of RCRT grid 
checks and when similarity of construction is measured by 
correspondence of RCRT grid voids. This was essentially a 
methodological hypothesis derived from the assumption, 
commonly employed in the analysis of the grid form of the 
RCRT, that cells left blank (voids) on the grid form of
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the RORT are measures of the same processes and can thus he 
utilized in the same way in analyzing the test as oells 
which have been oheoked. This hypothesis was not supported 
by the data of the study.
The fourth hypothesis stated that when persons are 
asked to predict the behavior of others they will predict 
most validly those individuals whom they most resemble in 
their behavioral ohoioes. Although this hypothesis was not 
deriyed directly from personal construct theory, it was in 
no way contradictory to what the theory would predict. 
Essentially, our reasoning in regard to this hypothesis was 
that as the individual interacts with others he construes 
them in terms of their similarity— dissimilarity to himself 
and that this construot is then used in making predictions 
about the other personsr behavior. Since it seems reason­
able to assume that the individual is the best predictor 
of his own behavior in a large number of situations, we 
would therefore expect him to be able to predict those per­
sons he oorreotly construes as similar to himself more 
validly than those whom he correctly or incorrectly con­
strues as dissimilar to himself. The results supported 
this hypothesis at an acceptable level of statistical 
significance.
With the exception of the third hypothesis the results 
were confirmatory of our experimental predictions. On the
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basis of these results we have reasoned that more confi­
dence can thus be placed on the assumptions and theoretical 
constructs utilized in the psychology of personal con­
structs. The results in regard to the third hypothesis 
were disoussed and it was concluded that reexamination of 
the methods developed to analyze the grid form of the RORT 
should be initiated.
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APPENDIX A
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBJECTS
INSTRUCTIONS
Two things in which many psychologists are interested 
at the present time are the oonoepts which we have about 
other people and the ability which we have to predict how 
other people are going to behave at some future time*
These are the two things with which we will be dealing this 
evening.
When we stop to think about it for a few moments it 
becomes evident that we do tend to classify or conceptual­
ize people as belonging to this or that group or as having 
this or that characteristic. For example, when we meet a 
professor we tend to classify him immediately as a pro­
fessor, and we feel that we know certain things about what 
he must be like simply because he is a professor. This 
process of forming oonoepts about people, then, is one of 
the things we will be working with tonight. More specifi­
cally, we are interested in how people of your age tend to 
conceptualize other people, and I’ve brought with me a test 
which is supposed to get at this very thing. We’ll take a 
look at it in a moment.
Also, although we don’t seem to think very much about
it, it seems pretty evident that we are always attempting
to predict how other people are going to behave in some
future situation. The factors that enter into our making
right or wrong predictions are of particular interest to
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some psychologists. I’ve brought with me some descriptions 
of a group of situations, and later I’d like to have each 
of you attempt to predict what eaoh other person in your 
group would do in these situations.
As you can see what I am interested in is the testing 
of some theoretical psychological problems rather than a 
testing of any of you as individuals, so I hope that none 
of you will feel "put on the spotn in any way. To make 
certain that you will free to put down exactly what you 
believe, rather than trying to impress anyone or worrying 
about what anyone might think of your answers, I will ask 
you to use only first names when you refer to yourselves or 
to the other group members. I can also guarantee you that 
I will be the only one to look at your answers. What you 
put down will have no effect upon your schooling, your 
sooial life, or anything else besides getting some answers 
to some important psychological problems.
Before we begin I’d like you to fill out the General 
Information sheet. The first section is nearly self- 
explanatory. Just fill in your age, your date of birth, 
and your school level at the end of this quarter. I think 
this can best be done by putting down the number of quar­
ters you have been in college. In the second section you 
will notice that there is a place to write down the first 
name of eaoh other member In your group. Each person’s
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number for the rest of the evening will be the one on the 
card in front of her. On one of the lines on the sheet you 
will, of oourse, find your own number. Just write ’’SELF” 
in that line.
In the column marked ’’How many years have you known 
her?” write down how long you have known each other person 
in your group. You oan signify months here by using a 
fraotion with 12 as the denominator. For example if you 
have known a person for 3 months that would be 3/12, 4 
months would be 4/12, and so on.
In the next oolumn I’d like to have you rank the other 
girls in your group according to how well you feel you know 
them. A 1 stands for the girl you think you know the best, 
and a 5 for the girl you think you know least well. You 
will then rank all of the other girls in your group from 1 
to 5. You won’t, of oourse, include yourself. Remember, 1 
stands for the girl you feel you know best, while 5 stands 
for the one you feel you know least well.
In the next seotion I ’ve asked you to rank, as we did 
above, the other girls in your group in terms of how com­
fortable you feel with each one. If you stop to think for 
just a minute I think you will realize that we feel more 
at ease or more comfortable with some people than we do 
with others. When we are around some people we feel that 
we just oan’t let ourselves go, or be completely free. We
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seem to be worrying or wondering quite a bit what they are 
thinking about us, and consequently we just don't feel too 
secure around them. There are other people, however, 
around whom we feel completely at ease and comfortable. We 
feel that we can say just what we have on our mind and they 
won't dislike us for it; we can joke and kid with them and 
we know they won't take it wrong. In other words we feel 
that we can just be ourselves around them and not worry 
about putting up any kind of a "front" to make them like 
us.
Now what I'd like you to do is rank the other persons 
in your group according to how oomfortable you feel when 
you are with each. Thus you would put a 1 after the number 
of the person with whom you feel most comfortable, a 2 
after the number of the person with whom you feel next most 
oomfortable, a 3 after the next, a 4 after the number of 
the next person, and a 5 after the number of the person 
with whom you feel most uncomfortable. You will, of 
oourse, cross out the blank that corresponds to your own 
number.
Now the last thing on this page is a scale on which 
I'd like to have you try to rate how oomfortable you feel 
with eaoh other person in the group. As you will notice 
it runs from feeling completely ill at ease and uncomfort­
able to feeling completely at ease and oomfortable with
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another person. Here you are to write down the number of 
eaoh other person where you think she belongs on the scale. 
This oan probably be done most easily by first placing the 
person with whom you feel most oomfortable somewhere on the 
soale, then the person with whom you feel the most uncom­
fortable* These are the ones you ranked as 1 and 5, 
respectively, above. Then plaoe the rest of the group mem­
bers somewhere in between.
Kfow let*s take a look at the test we have been using 
in an attempt to find out how people conceptualize or think 
about other people. If you will look at this sheet you 
will see that there are written on it some descriptions of 
some people with whom you have come into contact. At the 
left there are some blank spaces. All you have to do is to 
read the description of the person and then write his or 
her first name in the blank that corresponds to that per­
son. For example, your own first name would go in blank 1, 
your mother*s first name in blank 2, your father*s first 
name in blank 3, and so on* You will notice that the next 
five blanks have spaces marked for the other members of 
your group. They are marked I, II, III, IF, F. If one of 
these numbers is yours cross that out and put number FI 
there. For example, number I would cross out I on the 
sheet and write number FI. She would then put down the
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first name of number VI in blank 4. OK you oan fill out 
the rest of it. Remember not to repeat any names* From 
now on we will oall this the FIGURE LIST.
All right, let's take a look at this next part. This 
looks a little complicated, but I think it will go easily 
after you once get started. First put your number, group 
letter, and the date at the top of the page. Now take the 
figure list which we have just completed, turn it sideways, 
and then slide it down even with this first row of squares 
so that the double lines line up. (Demonstrated). Notice 
that three of the squares have circles in them. This means 
that you are first to consider the three people whose names 
appear on the figure list in the oolumns numbered 4, 9, and 
14. Think about these three people. Are two of them alike 
in some important way that distinguishes them from the 
third person? Keep thinking about them until you remember 
an important way in whioh two of them are alike and which 
sets them off from the third person. When you have decided 
whioh two it is you think are alike, and the important way 
in which they are alike, put an X in the two circles 
corresponding to the two who are alike. Do not put any 
mark in the third circle.
Now write in the first blank line to the right the
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word or short phrase that tells how these two are alike.
Next, write in the second blank space what you consid­
er to be the opposite of this characteristic.
Now oonsider eaoh of the other twelve persons whose 
names appear at the tops of the columns 1 through 15. In 
addition to the persons you have marked with an X, which 
ones also have the characteristic which makes these two 
alike? Put a check mark in the square under the name of 
each other person who has this important characteristic. 
Thus all of those whom you think have this oharaoteristic 
will have a oheok mark and all of those who have the 
opposite of this characteristic will have a blank space 
under their name.
Now slide the figure sheet down one row to row 2.
Think about persons 1, 7, and 10— the three who have cir- 
oles under their names. In what important way are two of 
these alike and at the same time distinguished from the 
third? Put X*s in the oiroles to show which two of them 
are alike. Write the way in which they are alike in the 
first blank to the right and the opposite of this char­
acteristic in the second blank to the right. Then con­
sider the 12 other persons• Put a cheok mark in the 
square for each other person that has this characteristic 
and leave the square blank for eaoh person that has the 
opposite of this characteristic.
Now move to the third row and do the same thing as you 
have been doing.
As you go through this you might find that you will 
tend to start cheoking people off without thinking too much 
about them, This would make any results that I get from 
the test meaningless. Try to be as accurate and careful as 
you can in cheoking those persons that have the character­
istic or leaving blank those that have the opposite. I 
realize that this is very difficult, but it is extremely 
important.
Break------Prediction situations (Instructions read with
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APPENDIX B
MATERIALS USED
GENERAL INFORMATION SHEET 
ROLE CONSTRUCT REPERTORY TEST 
SITUATIONS PREDICTION TEST
AGE AT NEXT BIRTHDAY”
DATE OF BIRTH _____
TSARS COMPLETED 
IN SCHOOL
FIRST NAI'IE HOW MANY YEARS HOW WELL DO
HAVE YOU KNOWN DO YOU KNOW
HER? HSR?
(1 Ii uest,
5 lor least)
HOW COMFORTABLE DO YOU FEEL WITH EACH? 
(1 for most comfortable, 5 for least)
I
II  __
I?* _____
IV  ___
V _____
VI
GROUP MEMBER X
GROUP MEMBER II
GROUP MEMBER III
GROUP MEMBER IV
GROUP MEMBER V
GROUP MEMBER VI
J---- — ~+
1 2
MAKES ME 
FEEL 
ILL AT EASE 
AND UN­
COMFORTABLE
  j ----
3 A
MAKES MS 
FEEL 
FAIRLY UN­
COMFORTABLE
5
DOESN»T 
MAKE ME 
FEEL UN­
COMFORTABLE., 
BUT I’M STILL 
NOT COMPLETELY
f—— — ---4—
6 ?
MAKES ME 
FEEL 
FAIRLY 
COMFORTABLE
& 9
MAKES ME 
FEEL 
COMPLETELY 
AT EASE AND 
COMFORTABLE
I
CONCEPTUAL GRID OVERLAY SHEET 
Figure List
f
lo Write your own name in the first "blank here.
2 o Write your mother i!s first name here i If you grew up with a step=- 
mothsr.-, write h?r name in stead 0
3„ Write your father'Js name here* If you grew up with a stepfather £> 
write his name instead:
4o Write the first name of group member I in this bl&nko
5o Writs the first name of group member II in this blanks
6o Group member III.,-.
7, Group member IV s
8.. Group member 7,
♦Prom this point on DO HOT REPEAT M Y  NAMES, If a person has already been 
listeds simply wake a second choice.
f- u*, v
 ; — ~
— \  9, Your -oreseat. closest friend*
10. Your closest this friend immediately before the person mentioned on 
blank y ,
11. Your closest ’present friend of the same sax as yourself,
12. A person of the sarae sex as yourself whom you once thought was 
a close friend but in whom you were badly disappointed later,
\ s 0 A person whom you would most like Co help or for whom you feel sorry-.-
14* The most successful person, whom you knowpersonallys
15o The happiest person whom you know personally.
H
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INSTRUCTIONS On the following pages theia are some descriptions of
situations in which you and the other members of this group might 
possibly find yourselves, After each situation is described there are 
two choices given as to how a person might act in that situation, These 
choices are labeled "A" and "B", To the right of the description of 
each situation there are three columns of lines labeled "HAI-IE", "CHOICE 1" 
and 11 CHOICE 2" „ Under the column marked "NAME" you will first notice a 
line marked "SFLF". You are to rut your first name on this line. Then on 
the line in the column marked "CHOICE 1" you are to put down which of the 
two choices you would make if you were actually in that situation. You are 
thusto put down what you would do if you were faced with that situation.
Underneath the space marked "SELF" there are spaces provided for 
writing down the number and first name of each other member of this 
group. Then following the name of each group member, under the 
column labeled "CHOICE 1", you are to put down the choice that you think 
each other member of the group will put down. Thus if you think that 
group member I will put down a "B" for situation 1, you trill write a 
njyt in the line following her name. Sometimes, however, you may feel that 
for some reason or other a person might put down one choice on paper but 
make the other choice if she were really in the situation. Although you 
think she would put down "B" on this paper, you think she might choose 
"'A" if she were actually in the situation. You would then put an "A" in 
the line following her name in the column labeled "CHOICE 2", If you think 
the person would actually do what she says she would do you would then 
put either an "A" or "B" in both the CHOICE 1 and CHOICE 2 columns. In 
the column labeled "CHOICE 1", then, you are to put down the choice that 
you think the other person will put down for herself, and in the column 
labeled "CHOICE 2" you are to put down the choice she would make if she 
were actually in the situation. These may or may not be the same. It «n 
depends on how many times you feel the other person would put down one 
thing on the paper but do the other tiling if she were really in the situation.
1. If parents suddenly told her they T-IAME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2
couldn’t afford to send her to college
any longer, she would,«. SELF____ _ ___
A, Go home and give up the idea 
of college,
B. Try to find a job to work her 
way through college.
2, If 'was at a dance with a boy NAME CHOICE 1 choice 2_
she knew pretty well and another
fellow kept cutting in, she would,,, SELF  ________
A, Dance with him each time.
Bo Tell him to stop cutting in.
If was asked -to discuss In class HAI-tE CHOICE 1
some course work she hadn't prepared,
she would.„0 SELF____  ___
A, Try to give some kind of an 
answer o
B. Tell the professor she wasn't 
prepared.
im-m choice i
SELF
A. Go out with him.
B0 Hot go out with him.
If one of rooiaahtes was .. 
dating a fellow pretty steadily, 
and he asked her for date, she 
would..o
If had a date with her "steady” 
and she wanted to go to a dance 
while he wanted to go to the show, 
she wouldo.o
A, Try to '-ersuade him to go to 
the danceo 
B0 Forget about the dance and go 
to the showc.
If won a contest with a picture HAHE CHOICE 1
she had painted, she would
SELF ___   ___
A. Tell all of her friends right _____________
away. ____  ___
Bo Probably not say very much _____________
about it.
rIAHE CHOICE 1
SELF
If went out on a blind date HAME CHOICE JL
and found out that the guy was
pretty "fast", she would..» SELF  ___
A. Go out an another date if he 
asked her.
B„ Hot go out with him again if 
he asked her.
CHOICE 2
CHOICE 2
CHOICE 2
CI.OICE 2
CHOICE 2
8. If one of close friends invited her
to spend the vacation between quarters 
at her home, she would„oe
A. Go x-Jith her.
B0 Tell her she had to go home0
M H E CHOICE 1
SELF
If took a speech class and during 
the first class meeting the professor 
asked her to get up and give an 
extemporaneous talk, she would0. «
A. Talk easily and assuredly for 
half an hour#
B. Get nervous and uneasy and be 
able to talk for only about 
five minutes.
riAiiE CHOICE 1
SFLF
10o If met a boy whom she felt was pretty 
"sharp", but who wasn’t a fraternity 
man, she would...
A* Bate him anyway.
B. Not date him.
FAME CHOICE 1
SELF
11# If wanted to go to Hew York City
for a week’s vacation and her parents
told her she couldn't go, she would..,
A. Argue with them, trying to get 
them to change their minds.
B. just accept their refusal to 
let her go and try to find 
something else to do.
hahe CHOICE 1
SELF
12. If one of friends wanted to borrow a 
dress she had just bought, she would. „ #
:-\I IE CHOICE 1
SELF
CHOICE 2
CHOICE 2
CHOICE 2
CHOICE 2
CHOICE 2
A. Let her have it.
B« Tell her she was going to wear it.
13® If was behind in her studying for NAME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2
a certain course and was having an exam
the next day, she would..® SELF_____ ____
A. Stay up all night studying® _____ ____ ____
Be Study a couple of hours and    _____ ____
hope to get a passing grade     _____
in the exam. _____  ____ ____
lit. If met a boy she really liked, 
she would.
A. Take his pin right away.
B. Date him a long time before 
taking his pin*
NAME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2 o»
SELF
l£. If one of friends told her she was NAME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2
going to nominate her for the vice- ~ ~
presidency of I v iv class, she would. „„ SELF  ____
A. Encourage her.
B. Discourage her.
l60 If was at a movie with a group of her DAME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2 
friends and an older man leaned over ~
and told her they were making too much SELF  ______ ____
noise, she would... ______ ____ ____
A. Mot pay any attention to him® 
B„ Try to get the girls to quiet 
doxm.
17. If got into some kind of trouble NAME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2
which seemed pretty serious to her, ~
she would..® SELF
A. Turn to her parents for help®
B. Try to work it out herself„
18. If was pinned to a boy at school TIflJ-IE CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2^
and then met a nice gay from her
home town while on summer vacation, SELF  ___
she woulda.* ____  ___  ___
• A. Late the boy from her home 
town for the summer*
B. Not date the boy from her home 
town0
10. If_ got fifteen dollars as a
birthday present to spend as she 
wished, she would...
A. Buy a new skirt*
B. Buy a few books she has been 
wanting.
•P"
NAME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2 ^
SELF
20 « If was on a party with a date and  ME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2
one of the other boy's date started
making some pretty insulting remarks SELF ______ ____
to her, she would...     _____
A. Let the girl know right then________ _____  ____ - ■ ■ - ■
and there that she didn't care______ _____ ____ ____
for her remarks.         __
B. Just overlook the remarks, not 
saying anything about them.
21. If after graduating from college  NAME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2
was offered a good job which would “ ~
take her quite a distance from her SELF _____
home,,she would... .
A. Take the job with little 
hesitation.
B. Do'oide to try to find a job 
closer to heme.
22. o If in a meeting someone got up and NAME CHOICE 1 CHOICE 2
made a motion with which didn't “
agree, she would... SELF_____ ___
A. Be among the first to stand 
up and openly disagree.
B. Hold back and see if someone 
else wouldn't disagree with 
the motion*
23 o If went on a double date and HAI-IE CHOICF 1 CHOICE
found out the other girl was
somebody she didn’t like veiy SHF  ________
well, she would, »<>   „_ ___
A0 Hot try very hard to cover 
up her dislike for the 
girl,
B0 Try to cover up her dislike 
for the girl,,
2ho If saw a good looking fella HAHE CHOICE 1 CHOICE L
at a dance and decided she wanted 
to meet him, she wouldoeo SELF___
A0 Figure out some excuse for 
walking over and talking 
to him,
B. Wait to see if he would notice 
her.
2$a If got pretty poor grades for UAHE CHOICE 1 CHOICE ;i
a couple of quarters a nd her parents
started demanding that she drop SELF _
some of her activities, she would,,.0_______ ___  ___
A, Drop the activities and try 
to raise her rrades *
B, Try to convince her parents 
that the activities had nothing 
to do with her grades*
26, If had a few dates with a boy M  CHOICE 1 CHOICE I
and liked him quite a bit but ~
found she was getting quite a SELF ______
reputation by dating him, she  _________ _ __
would*3,
A, Keep on dating him anyway, 
B„ Stop dating him.
I r
\\
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APPENDIX C
INTRA-INDIVIDUAL CORRELATIONS
s1
2
3
h
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Ih
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
21*
25
26
Table 11 
Intra—Individual Correlations;
Similarity of Construction and Similarity of Prediction
r r r
Constr.-P I Constr.-P II Checks-P I
.51* .58 .67
*67 .81 .01
-.33 .01 -.3 9
.31* -.05 .01
-.18 -.16 -.15
.98 .97 .60
.13 -.07 .37
.23 -.16 -.11*
-.55 -.36 .32
.01 .01 .18
.21 .22 .31
.82: .93 .69
.53 .62 -.ok
-.07 -.0U .66
.51 .85 .59
.1*5 .62 -.0 9
.70 .32 .81
.1*3 .27 .1*8
.92 .07 .11
.86 .23 •1*8
.21 .26 .39
.57 .37 .60
.73 .18 .1*9
-.10 .23 .51*
.83 .73 .76
.35 .15 .32
r r r
Checks-P II Voids-P I Voids-P II
.60 .30 .36
•69 .87 .61*
•20 .00 -.31*
.05 .38 -.07
-.15 -.05 -.07
•5o .82 .87
-.03 -.73 -.1*8
-.10 J il . -.13
-.27 -.6 1 -.21*
.1*2 -.0 9 -.23
.33 .08 .07
.82 .77 .85
.oh .7h .76
.77 -.55 -.66
.86 -.3 5 -.23
.1*1* .66 .31
.58 -.10 -.1*2
.29 .30 .20
-.35 .93 .18
.39 .57 .Oh
.1*1* .05 .09
.1*6 -.17 -.2 1
.21* .58 .16
.1*1* - .h i -.02
.51 .61 .73
.28 .07 -.06
s27
28
29
30
31
32
33
3h
35
36
37
38
39
bO
la
h2
h3
hh
1+5
h.6
hi
1+8
h?
50
51
52
53
Table 11 (Continued)
Intra-Individual Correlations 
Similarity of Construction and Similarity of Prediction
Constr.-P I Constr.-P II Checks-? I
.35 .15 .32
-.05  .30 .15
•0U .52 -.11
.09 .1+3 -.31+
•1+8 .50 - .5 9
-.02  - .1 5  -.16
.61 .25 .18
.16 -.13  .26
.52 .57 .63
.31+ .29 .58
-.38  -.1+9 .20
-.02  .06 -.16
-.6 5  .36 .Ul
.11 .20 .16
.66 .73 .79
-.20  -.38  -.23
Jil .511 .ii5
-.3 0  .05 .27
.08 .08 -.5 5
- .1 0 .00 .30
-.16 - .3 6 .37
- .2 3 - .0 6 - .0 7
.63 .7it .53
.1+8 .U3 .21
-.15  -.51  .75
-.17  -.8?  -.H i
-.2 5  -.33  .51+
Checks-P II Voids-P I Voids-P II
.28 .07 -.06
.12 -.2 3  .31
.10 .21+ .68
.02 .27 .52
-.30  .70 .56
.35 .08 -.33
.10 .58 .22
.21+ .21+ -.30
.65 .3U .1+0
.57 .31 .39
.15 -..U7 -.52
-.23  .27 .52
.29 -.6 7  .13
.67 -.02  -.38
.77 - .1 9  -.06
- .2 7 .00 - .1 0
.51+ .28 .h i
.28 -.1:6 -.25
-.5 5  .15 .15
.1+6 -.32. -.31
*21 - .33  - .5 2
-.21  -.2.0 .08
.70 .1+7 .1+3
.10 .60 .66
.19 - .2 5  -.53
-.15 .00 .03
.1+5 -.32  -.1+9
Table 11 (Continued) 
Intra-Individual Correlations
Similarity of Construction and Similarity of Prediction
s Constr.-P I Constr.-P II Checks-P I Checks-P II Voids-P I Voids-P
54 *04 -.2 4 .27 -.0 5 -.2 5 -.0 4
55 -.0 2 .06 -.3 1 -.1 9 .12 .13
56 -.2 5 Ji 2 .39 .15 -.6 3 .34
57 -.2 0 -.1 3 .28 .38 -.3 4 -.3 2
154
155
Table 12 
Intra-Individual Correlations
i
Comfort and Validity
Subject Comfort-Validity I Comfort-Validity II
1 .56 -.2 1
2 - .0 9 -.33
3 -.3 6 -.1 3
U .31 .06
5 .10 •5U
6 -.20 .UO
7 -*20 -.2 2
8 -.7 6 -.1 2
9 .89 .87
ID .37 .33
11 .52 .66
12: .08 .12
13 .80 .80
lU .73 * .50
15 .71 .liU
16 -.2 0 •53
17 •UO •U6
18 -.7 6 •7U
19 .95 .83
20 .35 .16
21 •UU .58
22 .06 -.0 ?
23 .03 .56
2Li .35 - .3 0
25 .91 .90
26 .27 .83
27 -.1 2 .51
28 -.U8 . .78
29 .58 .95
30 -.3 8 *uu
31 —.23 .19
32 .56 .08
33 .30 .90
3U •U9 •5U
35 - .0 9 .75
36 .00 .00
37 -.0 6 - .9 1
38 .UO -.0 7
39 .68 .80
Uo .00 .00
Ul -.U9 -.3 7
I|2 -.22 .U5
tb.ji
h3
Wi
U5
h6
U7
h8
h 9
$0
5 l
52
53
5U
55
56
57
156
Table 12 (Continued) 
Intra-Individual Correlations
Comfort and Validity
Comfort-Validity I
.61
►57
.59
•27 
-.2 3
.26
-.12
.55
•lU
.07
-•6U
*82
.07
.88
-.28
Comfort-Validity II
►20
.15
.Oil
.61
-.16
-.0 7
-.02
.58
.90
-.22;
-.8U
.9)4
.71
.97
.20
Table 13 
Intra-Individual Correlations 
Actual Similarity and Validity
Subject Actual Similarity-Validity I Actual Similarity-Validity II
1 *36 .02
2 .65 .83
3 .29 •67
h .01- -•1*3
5 - .8 0 - .7 0
6 - .1 2 .02
7 *39 •Uo.
8 -*98 - .2 0
9 1.00 .95
10 .1*7 .1*9
11 *5o •61
11 -.2 1 -•oh
13 -.2 0 - .1 0
lh .53 •U6
15 .70 .37
16 .82 .70'
17 - .3 0 - .3 0
18 .16 -•Ii5
19 .66 .90
20 .61 .33-
21 —.33 -.2.6
22 .57 .80
23 - .8 1 -.5U
2h -.06 - .5 3
25 -•Ii5 -.0 7
26 .38 - .1 5
27 -.9 7 -.63
28 -J |9 .87
29 -.1 3 -.03
30 .la - .1 1
31 .57 .19
32 .60 •16
33 .53 .30
3h - .5 6 - .5 9
35 .91 .51
36 .71 .69
37 *82' .55
38 .30 •1*9
15#
Table 13 (Continued)
Intra—Individual Correlations 
Actual Similarity and Validity
Subject Actual SimHarity-Validity I Actual Similarity-Validity II
39 •35 .07
ho —•22 .53
ia .68 ' ♦56
U2 •3U —.60
h3 •69 .62:
UU •09 .09
h$ .92 .75
k6 -.7 3 -.2 3
h i •53 .29
U8 •55 .56
U9 •72 .68
50 •76 .87
5 i .35 .51
52 .57 -.1 8
53 .00 .00
5U .70 •60
55 -.5 7 -.Uo
56 -.5 7 - .1 9
57 .17 •hh
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